2 ms·
The salts are just random strings. They can be stored with the hashed passwords. The security of the scheme does not depend on keeping salts secret. It depend
by jgrahamc 14y ago
The salts are just random strings. They can be stored with the hashed passwords. The security of the scheme does not depend on keeping salts secret. It depends on the strength of the hashing algorithm.
Two things:
1. Rainbow tables are today an irrelevance because of the speed of computers. What you need to worry about is not precomputed tables, but the ability to compute hashes when needed. The point of the salt is to prevent you precomputing anything.
2. So, suppose you have a database where (hash, salt) has been compromised for each user. Assuming salt was chosen randomly for each user then attacking the database boils down to calculating the hashes for common passwords incorporating the salt. The security of that will depend on the security of the hash algorithm and its slowness.
- hcurtiss 14y agoI think I get it. Using a unique salt, they'd have to completely rebuild their entire rainbow table for each password (given a unique salt for each). Is that right? Even then, it seems like they might want to use a smaller dictionary, but rebuilding for each username would still be doable. Just slower. I totally get the slow algorithm part. Seems to me that's the trick. Our IT department is dead set against using password managers. I've been trying to learn why, given companies like lastpass use excessive salting/hashing and slow algorithms. Unfortunately, at this point, I fear my limited knowledge may actually surpass theirs. All I hear is grumbling about all my eggs being in one basket.
- finnw 14y ago#1 is not true. Algorithms like bcrypt rely on being so expensive to compute that brute-forcing is prohibitively expensive. bcrypt does use salt. If it did not then it would indeed be vulnerable to rainbow table attacks.