It being unclear that they're exploitable doesn't justify the fact that the reference implementation had known weaknesses that were only documented in the issue

It being unclear that they're exploitable doesn't justify the fact that the reference implementation had known weaknesses that were only documented in the issue tracker and a readme buried several directories deep and not referenced from elsewhere! It also doesn't justify failing to proactively inform any of the clients making use of olm that these issues had been identified, and now anyone who does feel that this is inside their code's threat model has to rush to port to the new implementation after public disclosure. Edit: but also if you're going to argue that it's unclear that these issues are remotely exploitable, it'd be helpful to discuss why - are there external constraints that ratelimit them such that the number of packets required is infeasible in any length of time? Is all the affected key material ephemeral and rotated before it's realistic to get a large enough sample? Just vibes?