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In case your browser doesn't speak RSS: Service is operating normally: Root cause for June 14 Service Event June 16, 2012 3:15 AM We would like to share some
by eli 14y ago
In case your browser doesn't speak RSS:
Service is operating normally: Root cause for June 14 Service Event
June 16, 2012 3:15 AM
We would like to share some detail about the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) service event last night when power was lost to some EC2 instances and Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) volumes in a single Availability Zone in the US East Region.
At approximately 8:44PM PDT, there was a cable fault in the high voltage Utility power distribution system. Two Utility substations that feed the impacted Availability Zone went offline, causing the entire Availability Zone to fail over to generator power. All EC2 instances and EBS volumes successfully transferred to back-up generator power. At 8:53PM PDT, one of the generators overheated and powered off because of a defective cooling fan. At this point, the EC2 instances and EBS volumes supported by this generator failed over to their secondary back-up power (which is provided by a completely separate power distribution circuit complete with additional generator capacity). Unfortunately, one of the breakers on this particular back-up power distribution circuit was incorrectly configured to open at too low a power threshold and opened when the load transferred to this circuit. After this circuit breaker opened at 8:57PM PDT, the affected instances and volumes were left without primary, back-up, or secondary back-up power. Those customers with affected instances or volumes that were running in multi-Availability Zone configurations avoided meaningful disruption to their applications; however, those affected who were only running in this Availability Zone, had to wait until the power was restored to be fully functional.
The generator fan was fixed and the generator was restarted at 10:19PM PDT. Once power was restored, affected instances and volumes began to recover, with the majority of instances recovering by 10:50PM PDT. For EBS volumes (including boot volumes) that had inflight writes at the time of the power loss, those volumes had the potential to be in an inconsistent state. Rather than return those volumes in a potentially inconsistent state, EBS brings them back online in an impaired state where all I/O on the volume is paused. Customers can then verify the volume is consistent and resume using it. By 1:05AM PDT, over 99% of affected volumes had been returned to customers with a state 'impaired' and paused I/O to the instance.
Separate from the impact to the instances and volumes, the EBS-related EC2 API calls were impaired from 8:57PM PDT until 10:40PM PDT. Specifically, during this time period, mutable EBS calls (e.g. create, delete) were failing. This also affected the ability for customers to launch new EBS-backed EC2 instances. The EC2 and EBS APIs are implemented on multi-Availability Zone replicated datastores. The EBS datastore is used to store metadata for resources such as volumes and snapshots. One of the primary EBS datastores lost power because of the event. The datastore that lost power did not fail cleanly, leaving the system unable to flip the datastore to its replicas in another Availability Zone. To protect against datastore corruption, the system automatically flipped to read-only mode until power was restored to the affected Availability Zone. Once power was restored, we were able to get back into a consistent state and returned the datastore to read-write mode, which enabled the mutable EBS calls to succeed. We will be implementing changes to our replication to ensure that our datastores are not able to get into the state that prevented rapid failover.
Utility power has since been restored and all instances and volumes are now running with full power redundancy. We have also completed an audit of all our back-up power distribution circuits. We found one additional breaker that needed corrective action. We've now validated that all breakers worldwide are properly configured, and are incorporating these configuration checks into our regular testing and audit processes.
We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience to those who were impacted by the event.
- namidark 14y agoSounds like Amazon is doing something wrong, shouldn't it fail over to Battery then Generator?
- WestCoastJustin 14y agoYou're correct. It goes battery then generator. If they didn't use battery first, then when the power initial failed all systems would be off-line as the generator takes about 15-30 seconds to kick in.
- ericabiz 14y agoHe's correct or incorrect, and that entirely depends on the facility. Many newer datacenters don't use battery banks--they are expensive to maintain and often cause more failures than they prevent.
- rdoherty 14y agoFrom what I can remember of a datacenter tour, most generators supply power to the batteries, which then supply power to servers. The batteries can only supply a few minutes (I think) of power, so the generators need to turn on immediately.
- mrkurt 14y agoBattery backup isn't usually considered a "failover" step, just like your desktop battery backup doesn't actually do much other than stop charging when the power goes out. Datacenters only really have battery backup to let the emergency generators come up.
- ericabiz 14y agoThe batteries at colocation facilities are only designed to hold power long enough to transfer to the generator. They're also a huge single point of failure. A better design is a flywheel that generates enough power. But datacenters are often hit with these generator failures (in my experience, once every year or so.) Amazon had a correct setup--but not great testing. By the way, these are great questions to ask of your datacenter provider: Are there two completely redundant power systems up to and including the PDUs and generators? How often are those tested? How do I set up my servers properly so that if one circuit/PDU/generator fails, I don't lose power? There is a "right way" to do this--multiple power supplies in every server connected to 2 PDUs connected to 2 different generators--but it's expensive, and many/most low-end hosting providers won't set this up due to the cost. (I ran a colocation/dedicated server company from 2001-2007.)