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I am positive that people in hospitals died as a direct result of this incident.
by bt1a 2y ago
I am positive that people in hospitals died as a direct result of this incident.
- JumpCrisscross 2y ago> I am positive that people in hospitals died as a direct result of this incident Do you have clinical or hospital administration experience? A source with evidence, even circumstantial?
- bt1a 2y agoYes
- JumpCrisscross 2y ago> Do you have clinical or hospital administration experience? A source… >> Yes You managed a hospital and failed to implement emergency downtime procedures? (Because that is actually criminal.) Or do you have a source?
- cholantesh 2y agoDeft goalpost shifting, nice.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- FireBeyond 2y agoApropos of anything else, “emergency downtime procedures” do not guarantee the same level of care as normal operations. I’ve worked in and out of hospitals as a critical care paramedic for years.
- JumpCrisscross 2y ago> “emergency downtime procedures” do not guarantee the same level of care as normal operations Agreed. It’s also plausible someone had a heart attack due to the stress of flight cancellations. Do we have any evidence of either? The difference between a bridge collapsing and everything we’re discussing is there isn’t much of a discussion around who died and why.
- RobRivera 2y agoAre you the orangutan doctor from futurama?
- JumpCrisscross 2y agoThe commenter said they did not believe hospitals “have the time nor resources to pause and put in place an emergency downtime operating protocol” [1]. That is a reasonable guess. It’s not something one would expect from someone with “clinical or hospital administration experience.” It’s a glib response, but so is “yes” to a request for attribution. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41217683 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41217683
- 0xBDB 2y ago> I am positive that people in hospitals died as a direct result of this incident. I'm less positive than you, just because my experience of healthcare infosec is that all a doctor has to do is say "I cannot be slowed down or prevented from doing x or people will die" and that's the end of any process or technical controls on x. Same with utilities. I've seen the ICS engineers say "No you cannot put a password on this console because I may need instant access to prevent a blackout / explosion" and that pretty much ends the discussion. Often that's not even wrong. Of course when there is a security incident there'll be a kneejerk reaction to that, and of course that's why ransomware groups love healthcare, but in the meantime, those risks seem reasonable. Which means I'm guessing Crowdstrike killed a lot of healthcare billing but not a lot of critical care systems because it got ripped off those 30 seconds after install if it was ever installed at all.