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> conceding defeat and accepting a centralized Internet I think you can still have decentralization without having to be a sysop. That may be server operators

by dngray 2y ago

> conceding defeat and accepting a centralized Internet I think you can still have decentralization without having to be a sysop. That may be server operators that run small servers etc. Decentralization doesn't inherently mean privacy though and it's important to remember that. > You still do not get the point here at all. This is not about storage Pretty sure signal servers can't intercept messages or decrypt them. In regard to the client you cannot send unencrypted messages. We do know that lawful interception warrants sent to Signal are not particularly effective only registration time and last connection time is available. https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/

AshamedCaptain 2y ago
> Pretty sure signal servers can't intercept messages or decrypt them. In regard to the client you cannot send unencrypted messages. We do know that lawful interception warrants sent to Signal are not particularly effective only registration time and last connection time is available. https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/ Please, I'm really trying to put the emphasis on metadata, and definitely Signal servers can intercept that at will. Even here on HN there was recently an article of how "lawful interception warrants" were targeting Apple's and Google's _push notification servers_ (those _by design_ really only have access to metadata -- that should speak about how important metadata is for law enforcement). The Signal server has access to significantly more metadata about you and your communications than your typical push server. Again, there's just no contest here: simply avoiding the issue of using their server in the first place is much better than anything they claim* to do (or even better than anything they could _physically_ do). * I absolutely detest these type of "our privacy is great, believe us!" pages. Time and time again it shown that they are absolutely useless. Where did Apple report that their push notification servers were tapped? The fact that a server collects enough data about you that it is a tempting target for authorities should be cause for concern, not relief.
- dngray 2y ago
  > Apple's and Google's _push notification servers_ This never effected signal as no data that is sensitive was ever sent via that. Again though warrants against Signal are not new, and for years law enforcement has been getting the same answers to their subpoenas. If it was "possible" as you say and that "they do", pretty sure the ACLU would not be making submissions to a court that "this is all that is available <registration date> & <connection date>" especially as the source code is open, it would be easy to verify if that was in fact true. > I absolutely detest these type of "our privacy is great, believe us!" pages The page literally has the legal request and reply, these would be able to be checked against court records. Remember being in contempt of a court order is actually punishable, so if there was more I'm sure Signal would have been fined by now lol.
  - AshamedCaptain 2y ago
    > This never effected signal as no data that is sensitive was ever sent via that. How are you still missing the point that this is _about metadata_? No one is sending "sensitive data" through a push notification in the first place. You have to go out of your way to do that. My point was to show you that the authorities _are_ after metadata.

by dngray 2y ago

AshamedCaptain 2y ago

> Pretty sure signal servers can't intercept messages or decrypt them. In regard to the client you cannot send unencrypted messages. We do know that lawful interception warrants sent to Signal are not particularly effective only registration time and last connection time is available. https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/ Please, I'm really trying to put the emphasis on metadata, and definitely Signal servers can intercept that at will. Even here on HN there was recently an article of how "lawful interception warrants" were targeting Apple's and Google's _push notification servers_ (those _by design_ really only have access to metadata -- that should speak about how important metadata is for law enforcement). The Signal server has access to significantly more metadata about you and your communications than your typical push server. Again, there's just no contest here: simply avoiding the issue of using their server in the first place is much better than anything they claim* to do (or even better than anything they could _physically_ do). * I absolutely detest these type of "our privacy is great, believe us!" pages. Time and time again it shown that they are absolutely useless. Where did Apple report that their push notification servers were tapped? The fact that a server collects enough data about you that it is a tempting target for authorities should be cause for concern, not relief.

dngray 2y ago
> Apple's and Google's _push notification servers_ This never effected signal as no data that is sensitive was ever sent via that. Again though warrants against Signal are not new, and for years law enforcement has been getting the same answers to their subpoenas. If it was "possible" as you say and that "they do", pretty sure the ACLU would not be making submissions to a court that "this is all that is available <registration date> & <connection date>" especially as the source code is open, it would be easy to verify if that was in fact true. > I absolutely detest these type of "our privacy is great, believe us!" pages The page literally has the legal request and reply, these would be able to be checked against court records. Remember being in contempt of a court order is actually punishable, so if there was more I'm sure Signal would have been fined by now lol.
- AshamedCaptain 2y ago
  > This never effected signal as no data that is sensitive was ever sent via that. How are you still missing the point that this is _about metadata_? No one is sending "sensitive data" through a push notification in the first place. You have to go out of your way to do that. My point was to show you that the authorities _are_ after metadata.