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> Or it is my home server sitting at my router serving my family. That works in your situation, but not for most people who don't want to have to maintain a mo

by dngray 2y ago

> Or it is my home server sitting at my router serving my family. That works in your situation, but not for most people who don't want to have to maintain a moving part. Also hosting in general on a residential connection can depend on the provider and even availability of good internet. For a lot of people it wouldn't even be possible if they wanted to and that's not getting into the technical investment they would have to make in knowing how to do such a thing in the first place. > And here you make the dangerous mistake that I most hate. It's not only trivially easy for the server operator to leak metadata, it's actually HARD to avoid it. It's a lot easier than simply not having that data server side in the first place like Signal for example.

AshamedCaptain 2y ago
> That works in your situation, but not for most people who don't want to have to maintain a moving part. Also hosting in general on a residential connection can depend on the provider and even availability of good internet. Frankly, that works for the majority of XMPP users -- let's not forget about that. But yes, this is a problem today for many consumers. However, I see this as a much better direction for the Internet as a whole to take -- see efforts such as ownCloud and the like -- , rather than just conceding defeat and accepting a centralized Internet, or worse: the extremely dangerous idea that centralization increases security. Which should only be seen as the non-sense it is. > It's a lot easier than simply not having that data server side in the first place like Signal for example. You still do not get the point here at all. This is not about storage. This is not about the server implementation. As long as there is a communication at all between me and the server and then my contacts and the server, it is irrelevant if you are storing the roster or not. ANYONE (*anyone with access to that server) can easily pick it up. In fact, it is HARD not to leak it up, even by accident. Barring a P2P Freenet-like thing, this is _unavoidable_. (and even with P2P/Freenet/Onion/whatever it's not trivial) And due to the nature of IMs, metadata is practically as big an issue than protecting the payload itself.
- dngray 2y ago
  > conceding defeat and accepting a centralized Internet I think you can still have decentralization without having to be a sysop. That may be server operators that run small servers etc. Decentralization doesn't inherently mean privacy though and it's important to remember that. > You still do not get the point here at all. This is not about storage Pretty sure signal servers can't intercept messages or decrypt them. In regard to the client you cannot send unencrypted messages. We do know that lawful interception warrants sent to Signal are not particularly effective only registration time and last connection time is available. https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/
  - AshamedCaptain 2y ago
    > Pretty sure signal servers can't intercept messages or decrypt them. In regard to the client you cannot send unencrypted messages. We do know that lawful interception warrants sent to Signal are not particularly effective only registration time and last connection time is available. https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/ Please, I'm really trying to put the emphasis on metadata, and definitely Signal servers can intercept that at will. Even here on HN there was recently an article of how "lawful interception warrants" were targeting Apple's and Google's _push notification servers_ (those _by design_ really only have access to metadata -- that should speak about how important metadata is for law enforcement). The Signal server has access to significantly more metadata about you and your communications than your typical push server. Again, there's just no contest here: simply avoiding the issue of using their server in the first place is much better than anything they claim* to do (or even better than anything they could _physically_ do). * I absolutely detest these type of "our privacy is great, believe us!" pages. Time and time again it shown that they are absolutely useless. Where did Apple report that their push notification servers were tapped? The fact that a server collects enough data about you that it is a tempting target for authorities should be cause for concern, not relief.
    - dngray 2y ago
      > Apple's and Google's _push notification servers_ This never effected signal as no data that is sensitive was ever sent via that. Again though warrants against Signal are not new, and for years law enforcement has been getting the same answers to their subpoenas. If it was "possible" as you say and that "they do", pretty sure the ACLU would not be making submissions to a court that "this is all that is available <registration date> & <connection date>" especially as the source code is open, it would be easy to verify if that was in fact true. > I absolutely detest these type of "our privacy is great, believe us!" pages The page literally has the legal request and reply, these would be able to be checked against court records. Remember being in contempt of a court order is actually punishable, so if there was more I'm sure Signal would have been fined by now lol.

by dngray 2y ago

AshamedCaptain 2y ago

> That works in your situation, but not for most people who don't want to have to maintain a moving part. Also hosting in general on a residential connection can depend on the provider and even availability of good internet. Frankly, that works for the majority of XMPP users -- let's not forget about that. But yes, this is a problem today for many consumers. However, I see this as a much better direction for the Internet as a whole to take -- see efforts such as ownCloud and the like -- , rather than just conceding defeat and accepting a centralized Internet, or worse: the extremely dangerous idea that centralization increases security. Which should only be seen as the non-sense it is. > It's a lot easier than simply not having that data server side in the first place like Signal for example. You still do not get the point here at all. This is not about storage. This is not about the server implementation. As long as there is a communication at all between me and the server and then my contacts and the server, it is irrelevant if you are storing the roster or not. ANYONE (*anyone with access to that server) can easily pick it up. In fact, it is HARD not to leak it up, even by accident. Barring a P2P Freenet-like thing, this is _unavoidable_. (and even with P2P/Freenet/Onion/whatever it's not trivial) And due to the nature of IMs, metadata is practically as big an issue than protecting the payload itself.

dngray 2y ago
> conceding defeat and accepting a centralized Internet I think you can still have decentralization without having to be a sysop. That may be server operators that run small servers etc. Decentralization doesn't inherently mean privacy though and it's important to remember that. > You still do not get the point here at all. This is not about storage Pretty sure signal servers can't intercept messages or decrypt them. In regard to the client you cannot send unencrypted messages. We do know that lawful interception warrants sent to Signal are not particularly effective only registration time and last connection time is available. https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/
- AshamedCaptain 2y ago
  > Pretty sure signal servers can't intercept messages or decrypt them. In regard to the client you cannot send unencrypted messages. We do know that lawful interception warrants sent to Signal are not particularly effective only registration time and last connection time is available. https://signal.org/bigbrother/ https://signal.org/bigbrother/ Please, I'm really trying to put the emphasis on metadata, and definitely Signal servers can intercept that at will. Even here on HN there was recently an article of how "lawful interception warrants" were targeting Apple's and Google's _push notification servers_ (those _by design_ really only have access to metadata -- that should speak about how important metadata is for law enforcement). The Signal server has access to significantly more metadata about you and your communications than your typical push server. Again, there's just no contest here: simply avoiding the issue of using their server in the first place is much better than anything they claim* to do (or even better than anything they could _physically_ do). * I absolutely detest these type of "our privacy is great, believe us!" pages. Time and time again it shown that they are absolutely useless. Where did Apple report that their push notification servers were tapped? The fact that a server collects enough data about you that it is a tempting target for authorities should be cause for concern, not relief.
  - dngray 2y ago
    > Apple's and Google's _push notification servers_ This never effected signal as no data that is sensitive was ever sent via that. Again though warrants against Signal are not new, and for years law enforcement has been getting the same answers to their subpoenas. If it was "possible" as you say and that "they do", pretty sure the ACLU would not be making submissions to a court that "this is all that is available <registration date> & <connection date>" especially as the source code is open, it would be easy to verify if that was in fact true. > I absolutely detest these type of "our privacy is great, believe us!" pages The page literally has the legal request and reply, these would be able to be checked against court records. Remember being in contempt of a court order is actually punishable, so if there was more I'm sure Signal would have been fined by now lol.