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I don't know who you're really talking to (it's not me), but all I'm saying is that CAP_BPF doesn't bother me much, because it's problematic only for a security
by tptacek 2y ago
I don't know who you're really talking to (it's not me), but all I'm saying is that CAP_BPF doesn't bother me much, because it's problematic only for a security boundary that is already problematic with a much lower degree of difficulty for attackers than the eBPF verifier.
- kortilla 2y ago> it's problematic only for a security boundary that is already problematic I’m absolutely talking to you because you’re dismissing an issue in a space where people are actively working to make it not “already problematic”. “I don’t care about hypervisor vulnerabilities because they are only problematic for a security boundary that is already problematic. Smart people are bare metal only.”
- tptacek 2y agoThen I don't understand your point. You don't improve security by being optimistic about attack surfaces.
- kortilla 2y agoMy point is you don’t dismiss something as unworthy of attention because it’s in a larger area that needs active attention. That pattern I’ve seen repeated for decades for things like “using credit cards to buy things online” to “cryptography protecting websites” to “hypervisors providing security”. It’s pointlessly negative and doesn’t contribute to meaningful technical discussions. It’s a useful opinion if you’re advising tech stacks to adopt today or whatever, but that’s not interesting for the state of the art.