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I'm missing the threat of ransomware in your explanation. The best concept does not help, if everything is always online and ransomware is able to encrypt your

I'm missing the threat of ransomware in your explanation. The best concept does not help, if everything is always online and ransomware is able to encrypt your backups. I personally use the following backup strategy: - Setup an encrypted ZFS Storage in the network (e.g. TrueNAS - in my case it is Proxmox) - Enable zfs-auto-snapshot for 15 min snapshots auto rotation (keep 24 daily, etc.) - NEVER (!) type in the passwords of ZFS Storage permitted users on any client, that could be affected by ransomware - Provide a user authenticated samba share to store all important data - try to prevent local storage of data - Sync the ZFS snapshots to an external USB drive every night (I use a tasmota shelly plug and an external usb case to power off the devices if they are not needed) # create current snapshot zfs snapshot -r "$NEW_POOL_SNAP" # first backup zfs send --raw -R "$SRC_POOL@$NEW_SNAP_NAME" | pv | zfs recv -Fdu "$DST_POOL" # incremental backup zfs send --raw -RI "$BACKUP_FROM_SNAPSHOT" "$BACKUP_UNTIL_SNAPSHOT" | pv | zfs recv -Fdu "$DST_POOL" - On Windows and macOS, backup the OS on an external drive - Use restic to keep an additional copy of the local files and folders somewhere else - Use a bluray burner to backup the most important stuff as a restic repository or encrypted archive (like very important documents, the best photo collections of you family, Keepass database, etc.) and put it to another location - If cloud storage is affordable for the amount of data you have, consider using restic to store your stuff in the cloud - From time to time try to restore a specific file from the backup and check if it worked and try to restore a full system (on an additional harddisk). This may sound overkill, but ransomware is a pretty bad thing these days, even if you think you are not one of its targets.

Xen9 2y ago
I believe that it was my mistake to not to define the scope & assumptions of the problem of backing up rigorously because this has confused many commenters. I believe that any ransomware either (1) exists inside a backup and is thus removable (2) would be accounted bh IDF-TOH. Actually, your comment also confuses me. By definition of a non-cloud backup, it follows that everything is not always online or accessable by a CPU. Whatever may the case be, your approach would be "practical" and not "theoretical" in that it does not seem to make any fruitful contribution to the problem I proposed. Theoretical approach would be to create a general semi-formal model of the (1) problem; EG scope, variables, failures of previous solutions (2) foundation, IE more or less what I call IDF-TOH as the first iteration of a solution (3) separate discussion for preparing for the future practical implementations of the "final" technical solution, EG integrations with what exists out there, possibly gathering ideas for how to make the interface human-friendly. Would you think an IRC, mailing list etc. would be good place – kn change of tactics – to stimulate discussion & research on this?
- sandreas 2y ago
  Well, then I totally misunderstood the problem. I'm not a researcher, so I don't think I can contribute much to your topic. However, Ransomware these days can: Lure on you system for a pretty long time until they take action (14 days or longer) Encrypt USB Disks, as they are attached Encrypt network drives Infect other systems connected to your network Delete existing backups on many online targets (also cloud) So even if you do a "cloud" backup and have the credentials on your system to do "convenient" backups, it may just delete them. A way to overcome this is to have an "append only" backup, so that the older backups are secure. I'm not sure you covered this, but as I already stated: I'm not a researcher.
  - Xen9 2y ago
    I believe that most good to the world would be done by first working out the theory & then developing an applet, EG website, that lasts long, and will automatically determine the best possible backup solution "real-world." This would use Bayesian heuristics, openly available data, user's personal requirements. Non-technical granny can press the buttons, it gives them a printable PDF-sheet that says keep three copies of this; these are your best possible backup rules. For a good design, the problem of changing requirements must be addressed. By mapping every scenario imaginable and implementing support for the transitions, usability would increase significantly. This'd answer your problem – I'd call it paranoia – of ransomware. By the way, qubesos can make at arbitrary times exact or near exact VM image backups, and and move files from one host OS to another, without shutting down, mitigating every non-targeted piece of ransom malware & majority of non-state-backed targeted ransom malware.

Xen9 2y ago

I believe that it was my mistake to not to define the scope & assumptions of the problem of backing up rigorously because this has confused many commenters. I believe that any ransomware either (1) exists inside a backup and is thus removable (2) would be accounted bh IDF-TOH. Actually, your comment also confuses me. By definition of a non-cloud backup, it follows that everything is not always online or accessable by a CPU. Whatever may the case be, your approach would be "practical" and not "theoretical" in that it does not seem to make any fruitful contribution to the problem I proposed. Theoretical approach would be to create a general semi-formal model of the (1) problem; EG scope, variables, failures of previous solutions (2) foundation, IE more or less what I call IDF-TOH as the first iteration of a solution (3) separate discussion for preparing for the future practical implementations of the "final" technical solution, EG integrations with what exists out there, possibly gathering ideas for how to make the interface human-friendly. Would you think an IRC, mailing list etc. would be good place – kn change of tactics – to stimulate discussion & research on this?

sandreas 2y ago
Well, then I totally misunderstood the problem. I'm not a researcher, so I don't think I can contribute much to your topic. However, Ransomware these days can: Lure on you system for a pretty long time until they take action (14 days or longer) Encrypt USB Disks, as they are attached Encrypt network drives Infect other systems connected to your network Delete existing backups on many online targets (also cloud) So even if you do a "cloud" backup and have the credentials on your system to do "convenient" backups, it may just delete them. A way to overcome this is to have an "append only" backup, so that the older backups are secure. I'm not sure you covered this, but as I already stated: I'm not a researcher.
- Xen9 2y ago
  I believe that most good to the world would be done by first working out the theory & then developing an applet, EG website, that lasts long, and will automatically determine the best possible backup solution "real-world." This would use Bayesian heuristics, openly available data, user's personal requirements. Non-technical granny can press the buttons, it gives them a printable PDF-sheet that says keep three copies of this; these are your best possible backup rules. For a good design, the problem of changing requirements must be addressed. By mapping every scenario imaginable and implementing support for the transitions, usability would increase significantly. This'd answer your problem – I'd call it paranoia – of ransomware. By the way, qubesos can make at arbitrary times exact or near exact VM image backups, and and move files from one host OS to another, without shutting down, mitigating every non-targeted piece of ransom malware & majority of non-state-backed targeted ransom malware.