> even if we wanted to, we are currently not able to make useful systems that are also secure to the degree that the current user base is still able to use it.

> even if we wanted to, we are currently not able to make useful systems that are also secure to the degree that the current user base is still able to use it. I disagree. We have computer systems now that are secure which the vast majority of people have no trouble using: phones and tablets. They are so secure band-aids like CrowdStrike and similar anti virus measures aren't needed on them. We've known for decades that desktops, such as Windows, MacOS and the majority of Linux use a broken security model. We know why it is broken: you can't trust the owner of the device, be that joe citizen or a corporate. Joe citizen will be socially engineered into installing something the modifies the OS, turning it into malware that can't be repaired. The corporate will buy something like CrowdStrike, which is essentially the same trick in a different guise: con the owner into installing something that makes the attacker money. A absolute precondition for an OS guaranteeing it is secure is it can't modified by a third party, and that includes the user. Yet we persist in providing OS's that do allow the user to modify them, and then pretend papering over that with things like anti-virus programs fixes the problem. We've also know for decades secret proprietary code that is so secret it comes with a licence that bans you from attempting to pull it apart and looking for vulnerabilities (via a licence banning you from reverse engineering), is pure poison for security. I need to have 100% faith Juniper does not have a backdoor, or and Microsoft is not still allowing MD5 signed certs in critical parts of it's infrastructure. Despite all that it's true that here we are in 2024, still using things that are insecure by design, and still buying hidden proprietary code from vendors that have included backdoor passwords in their products in the past. I'm not sure it is a political problem, but it sure isn't a "we don't know how to do better" problem. We do.