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For in-person voting use "fill in the oval" ballots that can be hand counted or counted by offline optical card scanners, and augment that with Scantegrity II [
by tzs 2y ago
For in-person voting use "fill in the oval" ballots that can be hand counted or counted by offline optical card scanners, and augment that with Scantegrity II [1].
Scantegrity II is a system that adds end-to-end voter verifiability [2] to such systems by combining some clever chemistry with some clever cryptography. It requires no hardware modifications at the voting site except that special markers have to be used to mark the ballots.
Briefly, a code is printed inside each oval using a special ink that is invisible, which turns visible when that oval is marked by a special marker.
After the election all the ballots can be published, allowing any third party to independently verify the counts.
Voters that wish to verify that their ballot was included in the count and counted correctly can note the code from the oval and afterwards use it to verify the count. The code cannot be used to prove to a third party, such as a vote buyer or vote coercer, that the person voted the "right" way. Here's a proof of that [3].
[1] https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/chaum/chaum_html/index.html https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/c...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy...
[3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/502.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/502.pdf
- codedokode 2y agoInteresting, but regarding this: > The code cannot be used to prove to a third party, such as a vote buyer or vote coercer, that the person voted the "right" way. What if the vote buyer is with the government and can actually inspect the ballots after voting? Knowing the code is a proof that you saw a specific ballot.