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> If any court interprets a statute in a way that Congress doesn't like, Congress can pass a new one that removes the ambiguity. That sounds great in theory, h
by consumer451 2y ago
> If any court interprets a statute in a way that Congress doesn't like, Congress can pass a new one that removes the ambiguity.
That sounds great in theory, however our Congress is known to be useless and in total gridlock. Our Supreme Court is known to vote along 6/3 partly lines, all precedent be damned.
These are predictable things, and given the known biases, this does not sound favorable towards agility which allows smart disruptive innovation, does it?
It seems like we have given all the power to 6 Supreme Court justices. I hope that they have the budget to hire many more clerks, as they will need them to micromanage the federal government.
From Justice Kagan's dissent on Chevron, page 82:
> This Court has long understood Chevron deference to reflect what Congress would want, and so to be rooted in a presumption of legislative intent. Congress knows that it does not—in fact cannot—write perfectly complete regulatory statutes...
> It knows that those statutes will inevitably contain ambiguities that some other actor will have to resolve, and gaps that some other actor will have to fill. And it would usually prefer that actor to be the responsible agency, not a court...
> Put all that together and deference to the agency is the almost obvious choice, based on an implicit congressional delegation of interpretive authority. We defer, the Court has explained, “because of a presumption that Congress” would have “desired the agency (rather than the courts)” to exercise “whatever degree of discretion” the statute allows. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517
U. S. 735, 740–741 (1996).
> Today, the Court flips the script: It is now “the courts (rather than the agency)” that will wield power when Congress has left an area of interpretive discretion. A rule of judicial humility gives way to a rule of judicial hubris. In recent years, this Court has too often taken for itself decision-making authority Congress assigned to agencies. The Court has substituted its own judgment on workplace health for that of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; its own judgment on climate change for that of the Environmental Protection Agency; and its own judgment on student loans for that of the Department of Education.
Emphasis above is mine.
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edit after a couple upvotes:
AFAICT, the administrative agencies are the only part of our government that has been functional in recent times.
Look at what the FAA has managed to pull off with a very limited budget. FAA interpreted laws to allow what SpaceX, and the rest of New Space has accomplished. Now what? There weren't omniscient laws passed, so Blue Origin for example, could theoretically tie SpaceX up in court for new launch licenses? And the final call will be made by a law clerk, instead of space industry professionals?
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- AnthonyMouse 2y ago> That sounds great in theory, however our Congress is known to be useless and in total gridlock. That's what they're supposed to do when there isn't public consensus. You have to convince enough people that you're right to get the votes to pass the bill. > Our Supreme Court is known to vote along 6/3 partly lines, all precedent be damned. Here's the list of opinions from last year: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_term_opinions_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_term_opinions_of_the_Supr... The table does not show predominantly 6/3 party line decisions. > These are predictable things, and given the known biases, this does not sound favorable towards agility which allows smart disruptive innovation, does it? The government isn't in the disruptive innovation business. The federal government in particular is supposed to do nothing in response to contentious issues, so the states can do multiple different things as their voters prescribe and then we can see what works the best. You shouldn't have any federal law on a new thing until it shakes out enough for people to reach consensus on what the federal law should be. And if that never happens then you let the different states have different laws. > Congress knows that it does not—in fact cannot—write perfectly complete regulatory statutes... Of course not, but it can certainly read a Supreme Court opinion and amend the law if there is consensus that the result was wrong. > And it would usually prefer that actor to be the responsible agency, not a court... We can dispatch with this with a simple question: Do you think agency determinations should be bound by stare decisis? Saying yes is obviously going to result in a rush to publish a rule resolving every ambiguity in the favor of whatever party is currently in power when the law passes, because the executive is a political branch, unlike the courts, and has only one elected official. This gives too much power to the executive. Saying no leads to the law flip flopping every time the Presidency changes parties, which is bad and the thing stare decisis is intended to prevent. Since both of the options lead to a problem, leaving the determination in the hands of the executive branch is the wrong choice. > It is now “the courts (rather than the agency)” that will wield power when Congress has left an area of interpretive discretion. Which is exactly the role of the courts. They can listen to the administrative agency's arguments, as well as the other side's, but deciding how to interpret the law is what courts do.