Nah, you've identified the problem and IMO it's quite philosophical. Like to me, what the person in this article describes is what someone else would call "seei

Nah, you've identified the problem and IMO it's quite philosophical. Like to me, what the person in this article describes is what someone else would call "seeing the apple". >She could think about an apple: its taste, its shape, its color, the way light might hit it. But she didn’t see it. Behind her eyes, “it was completely black,” Shomstein recalled. And yet, “I imagined an apple.” What is the difference between this, and what another person might describe as a hologram? There is no material way to confirm or disconfirm what someone says happens in their imagination. I can conjure an apple in three dimensions, I can rotate it in my mind with my eyes either opened or closed. I can imagine a wireframe of that apple, or multiple apples rolling down a staircase and I can conjure the physics of them bumping into one another and landing in a bruised pile. I am imagining that vividly, in full color and full holographic clarity, but I am imagining it right now as I type to you here. So... am I "seeing" it in my "mind's eye"? How would either of us know what the other meant if we said yes or no? To me, the person in the article is describing the physical reality (eyelids over eyeballs = darkness) as "seeing" just as much as someone else, say a math wiz, can close their eyes and see colorful geometry playing in spatial relationships with one another or a oil rig worker might start seeing slick black sludge on a piston. I don't see a point in creating taxonomies of imagination.