4 ms·
>> The stronger versions, things from List 1 and List 2, are mostly only seen in defense and intelligence And I don't think that is enough. I agree that it eas
by rowbin 2y ago
>> The stronger versions, things from List 1 and List 2, are mostly only seen in defense and intelligence
And I don't think that is enough. I agree that it easier and sufficient for most systems to just be connected over the internet. But health, aviation and critical infrastructure in general should try to be offline as much as possible. Many of the issues described with being offline stem from having many third party dependencies (which typically assume internet access). In general but for critical infrastructure especially you want as little third party dependencies as possible. Sure it's not as easy as saying "we don't want third party dependencies" and all is well. You'll have to make a lot of sacrifices. But you also have a lot to gain when dramatically decreasing complexity, not only from a security standpoint. I really do believe there are many cases where it would be better to use a severely limited tech stack (hardware and software) and use a data diode like approach where necessary.
One of the key headaches mentioned when going offline is TLS. I agree and I think the solution is to not use TLS at all. Using a VPN inside the air-gapped network should be slightly better. It's still a huge headache and you have to get this right, but being connected to the internet at all times is also a HUGE headache.