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Think about what usually happens when a certificate isn't revoked within the 24 hour window. It's not an immediate death sentence, the CABF discusses what happe

Think about what usually happens when a certificate isn't revoked within the 24 hour window. It's not an immediate death sentence, the CABF discusses what happened and decides if they still trust the CA to carry out their responsibilities. The CABF doesn't expect the CA to violate a court order, but there are sure to be questions about how the underscore bug happened, how their agreements should be re-written to reduce the risk of customers filing TROs, and how process has changed. Fixing bugs and re-writing agreements are solvable problems. I don't think the legal challenges shown here are unique to this CA. A good question for the CABF is how a CA can demonstrate that they've reduced this sort of legal risk. It's a hard problem because there's CAs in so many different legal jurisdictions.

deathanatos 2y ago
(Still not a lawyer.) To be clear, I think a TRO is also a pretty good excuse for technical of the rules, and the most likely thing is that people bend to accommodate here. > how their agreements should be re-written to reduce the risk of customers filing TRO I actually am not sure a clear agreement matters here. It could be they already have that (I didn't see evidence in the complaint that convinced me one way or the other); if the case proceeds long enough, this I expect will be evident in the ruling: either the agreement was clear, and they should have expected a possible revocation since it is inherently part of the system they're interoperating with (… this would be my default stance; ignorance of certs doesn't get you infinite leeway here) or the agreement wasn't clear at it's a contract breach as alleged. However, I also agree that, assuming they can rotate in 3 days like they said in the complaint, — but that is an assumption. I mean, IDK about your workplace, but I'm sure you've seen a deadline or ~~two~~ 100% slip? — then the case becomes moot and we'll never know, as there will be no ruling. That could very well happen, we'll have to see. > I don't think the legal challenges shown here are unique to this CA. A good question for the CABF is how a CA can demonstrate that they've reduced this sort of legal risk. It's a hard problem because there's CAs in so many different legal jurisdictions. I agree, though I think it is difficult to show that. Like I said, I'm not sure an ironclad agreement saves you from the TRO, here. The judge would still issue a TRO while deciding the agreement is, actually, ironclad, since the judge cannot start from the assumption that it is, and will err on the side of caution.
- 8organicbits 2y ago
  (also not a lawyer) I think you are right, even if the agreement was perfectly clear, a TRO can be issued. Either the CA system lives with this risk or we only trust CAs that operate in countries without this risk (do any exist?) Another approach is for the CA to revoke the cert first, then notify the customer. This avoids the TRO as the customer wouldn't know about the planned revocation until it was too late to act. Does the CAs desire to help customers swiftly move to a new certificate outweigh the risk that a customer would sue to get more time (causing the CA to fail to revoke quickly enough)?

deathanatos 2y ago

(Still not a lawyer.) To be clear, I think a TRO is also a pretty good excuse for technical of the rules, and the most likely thing is that people bend to accommodate here. > how their agreements should be re-written to reduce the risk of customers filing TRO I actually am not sure a clear agreement matters here. It could be they already have that (I didn't see evidence in the complaint that convinced me one way or the other); if the case proceeds long enough, this I expect will be evident in the ruling: either the agreement was clear, and they should have expected a possible revocation since it is inherently part of the system they're interoperating with (… this would be my default stance; ignorance of certs doesn't get you infinite leeway here) or the agreement wasn't clear at it's a contract breach as alleged. However, I also agree that, assuming they can rotate in 3 days like they said in the complaint, — but that is an assumption. I mean, IDK about your workplace, but I'm sure you've seen a deadline or ~~two~~ 100% slip? — then the case becomes moot and we'll never know, as there will be no ruling. That could very well happen, we'll have to see. > I don't think the legal challenges shown here are unique to this CA. A good question for the CABF is how a CA can demonstrate that they've reduced this sort of legal risk. It's a hard problem because there's CAs in so many different legal jurisdictions. I agree, though I think it is difficult to show that. Like I said, I'm not sure an ironclad agreement saves you from the TRO, here. The judge would still issue a TRO while deciding the agreement is, actually, ironclad, since the judge cannot start from the assumption that it is, and will err on the side of caution.

8organicbits 2y ago
(also not a lawyer) I think you are right, even if the agreement was perfectly clear, a TRO can be issued. Either the CA system lives with this risk or we only trust CAs that operate in countries without this risk (do any exist?) Another approach is for the CA to revoke the cert first, then notify the customer. This avoids the TRO as the customer wouldn't know about the planned revocation until it was too late to act. Does the CAs desire to help customers swiftly move to a new certificate outweigh the risk that a customer would sue to get more time (causing the CA to fail to revoke quickly enough)?