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> In reality one can obviously do a lot of things to improve safety in C/C++. That's not "in reality", that's "in theory". Because in actual reality, people st
by pdimitar 2y ago
> In reality one can obviously do a lot of things to improve safety in C/C++.
That's not "in reality", that's "in theory". Because in actual reality, people still write the good old buffer overflow bugs to this day.
I don't think anyone reasonable is disputing that we indeed can improve C/C++ programming. The argument of myself and many others like myself is: "a lot can be done but for one reason or another it is STILL NOT being done". Likely the classic cost cutting but there are likely other factors at play as well.
> But once this is understood, the obvious conclusion is that addressing some of these low-hanging fruits would be far more effective in improving safety than wasting a lot of time and effort in rewriting in Rust.
Explain why this has not been done yet. Explain why Microsoft, Google and various intelligence agencies attribute memory safety bugs to between 60% to 75% of all CVEs and demonstrable exploits that they are aware of.
Please do, I am listening. Why has almost nothing been done yet?
Secondly, "wasting a lot of time and effort in rewriting in Rust" is an empty claim. To demonstrate why, I ask you this: at which point the continued cost of investing in endlessly patching C/C++ and all its glorious foot-guns becomes bigger than the cost a rewrite?
Surely at one point just endlessly throwing money at something that gives you a 1% return of investment (in terms of getting more stable and less dangerously buggy) does indeed get more expensive than starting over?
I have no clear answer because it depends on the organization, the tenure of C/C++ and the devs in the org, and many others. It's strange that you pretend to have the answer.
- nanolith 2y ago> That's not "in reality", that's "in theory". Because in actual reality, people still write the good old buffer overflow bugs to this day. That's because while the technology exists, it is not widely communicated. That's not a fault of C, and that's not something that any language can solve. > Explain why this has not been done yet. See above. The technology to make C and C++ safer is not yet widely used. But, it exists and it is being used. I use it on every firmware and OS project that I currently work on. The code we produce is free of memory errors, integer errors, API misuse errors, resource management errors, cryptography errors, confused deputization errors, and a host of other errors that our specifications are designed to catch. That goes well beyond what Rust or any other language can provide on its own. But, to be fair, Rust developers can do this using similar tooling. It's laudable that you wish to rid the world of memory errors. I want to normalize going three or four steps further. Rust by itself won't get us there.
- pdimitar 2y ago> That's not a fault of C, and that's not something that any language can solve. If you say so. Rust clearly does, and before you go saying "but `unsafe` exists!" I'll have to remind you that (1) scarcely any Rust devs reaches for that and (2) it still keeps quite a lot of guarantees and only relaxes some. Some, not all. Not even most. > It's laudable that you wish to rid the world of memory errors. I want to normalize going three or four steps further. Rust by itself won't get us there. Well now we are on the same page. I never said "ONLY Rust will save us", I am saying that Rust clearly can get us further than we are right now. If there's something even more accessible, less verbose, and with not such a cobbled together Frankenstein async implementation like Rust, I'll start using it tomorrow.
- nanolith 2y ago> Rust clearly does Until it exists at the kernel layer, the firmware layer, the runtime library layer, and the application layer, these issues still exist. CVEs come out weekly for memory errors in Linux, in firmware, in operating system libraries, and in application libraries. We need to think beyond rewriting code in one language or platform, and instead think about technologies that we can apply to all languages and platforms, including C and Rust. > I am saying that Rust clearly can get us further than we are right now. As can bounded model checking, without having to teach developers a new language with new idioms. > If there's something even more accessible, less verbose, and with not such a cobbled together Frankenstein async implementation... Indeed there is. Reach for the bounded model checker that works with your existing language or platform. Pour over the manual, and look at existing practical examples. If you like Rust, feel free to use it. But, if you prefer C/C++, Pascal, Ada, Python, C#, Java, or Modula2, that's fine. Either use an existing bounded model checker for that language or port CProver / GOTO to that platform. Rust developers ported CProver to Rust via Kani, because they also recognize that writing safer code can't be done by language alone. I don't think it's necessary to push people to use different languages or platforms to write safer code. They just need to use or port existing tooling and learn safer coding practices. If I come at firmware developers or old school OS developers with "we need to use Rust", the conversation is immediately shut down and I'm considered a fool. If, instead, I show them tooling that allows them to maintain their existing code base and make it safer, I get much further.