To answer some of my questions based on the "Preliminary Post Incident Review", the config file was indeed invalid, it was only checked with a (buggy) validator

To answer some of my questions based on the "Preliminary Post Incident Review", the config file was indeed invalid, it was only checked with a (buggy) validator, and then released to the whole world at once. Never was the config file ever tested with the actual software that would read it in an actual environment like the customer machines that got this update. They don't say why it was invalid or really what the file is, but it seems like it is some kind of relatively complex set of rules that are evaluated by the kernel module. Presumably they are manually authored and reviewed and it seems possible the bug was missed in review because this was a relatively new type of rule. So this isn't a case of an incident that slipped through a rigorous testing and release process process following industry best practice, but rather a "disaster waiting to happen". Further, CrowdStrike CEO George Kurtz should have known better, considering an analogous incident happened under his watch as CTO of McAfee in 2010. https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediation-and-guidance-hub/ https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediatio...