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I don't think you understand the argument, which is not that the systems component stack for virtualized workloads is entirely memory safe, but rather that the
by tptacek 2y ago
I don't think you understand the argument, which is not that the systems component stack for virtualized workloads is entirely memory safe, but rather that the world Theo was describing in 2007 no longer exists. For instance, based on this comment, I'm not sure you understand what Theo was referring to when he described the second operating system implicated in that stack.
- Veserv 2y ago[flagged]
- tptacek 2y agoI've written roughly 250 words in this whole thread, following your original response to me. You've written 450 words in this single comment, which purports to summarize my argument. You're starting to sound like Vizzini. Unfortunately for you: I have built up a resistance to iocane powder, largely by actually reading the code you're talking about. My experience, when simple, falsifiable, or technically specific arguments are met with walls of abstraction, is that there's not much chance a productive, well-informed debate is about to ensue. I made my point about the currency of Ceiling Theo's take on virtualization. I'm happy with where it stands. I don't at this point even understand what we're arguing about, so here's where I'll bow out.
- Veserv 2y agoI literally presented a direct counterexample falsifying your claim that KVM + Rust results in highly secure virtualization. Even though you have rejected even attempting to define what would constitute highly secure, by no reasonable metric is 2 person-months highly secure. All you have done is present things that you imagine improve things, and then demand I prove your imagination wrong without presenting any actual empirical evidence for your position. They rewrote a component in Rust, my imagination thinks it just has to be very secure. 2 person-months. Fat lot of good that did. New boss, same as the old boss. Just like I said.