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I'm not a lawyer, and I'm definitely not a French lawyer, but I don't think the OVH comparison is valid. In the OVH case, their backup system (as a whole) fail
by Retr0id 2y ago
I'm not a lawyer, and I'm definitely not a French lawyer, but I don't think the OVH comparison is valid.
In the OVH case, their backup system (as a whole) failed. Many customers were left with 0 data, and per the article "the court ruled the OVH backup service was not operated to a reasonable standard and failed at its purpose".
Meanwhile CrowdStrike "just" crashed their customer's kernels, for a duration of about 1 hour (during which they were 100% safe from cyber attacks!). Any remaining delays getting systems back online were (in my view) due to customers not having good enough disaster recovery plans. There's certainly grounds to argue that CrowdStrike's software was "not to a reasonable standard", but the first-order impacts (a software crash) are of a very different magnitude to permanently losing all data in a literal ball of fire (as in the OVH case).
Software crashes all the time. For better or for worse, we treat software bugs as an inevitability in most industries (there are exceptions, of course). While software bugs are the "fault" of the software vendor, the job of mitigating the impacts thereof lies with the people deploying it. The only thing that makes the CrowdStrike case newsworthy, compared to all the other software crashes that happen on a daily basis, is that CrowdStrike's many customers had inserted their software into many critical pathways.
CrowdStrike sells a playing card, and customers collectively built a house with them.
(P.S. Don't treat this as a defense of CrowdStrike. I think their software sucks and was developed sloppily. I think they should face consequences for their sloppiness, I just don't think they will, under current legal frameworks. At best, maybe people will vote with their wallets, going forwards.)
- fabian2k 2y agoIt didn't just crash, it crashed 100% of computers running it at that time and in a way that required physical intervention to fix. So I think you can considers this quite different from regular crashes because recovery is much more difficult and because it affected a lot of computers simultaneously. On top of that there are companies that had failures of their own in their recovery procedures. But even with good procedures this can be a significant outage because it is not trivially reverted and would typically affect many configurations that are redundant for many other failures.
- Retr0id 2y agoIf the uptime of 100% of your computers depends on a single vendor not writing software with bugs in it, you have a problem.
- fabian2k 2y agoThat would mean that you always need a fully redundant copy of everything based on entirely different OSes and software with no common component. That is obviously not realistic.
- Retr0id 2y agoBuilding high-assurance systems is expensive. Anyone not doing so must accept the associated risks (which is fine, not everything needs to be high-assurance).
- withinboredom 2y agoNo. You just need to not update them all at the same time.
- simiones 2y agoUnfortunately, CrowdStrike decides when it's time to upgrade CrowdStrike software, not the admins.
- prmoustache 2y ago1. Your IT department shouldn't buy a product that let a third party change files on your system remotely. This one is the basis of computer security. 2. Your IT department shouldn't buy a product that doesn't give you control on when updates are applied. These are 2 huge security failures from your IT department.
- simiones 2y ago
- vesinisa 2y ago> for a duration of about 1 hour Not even remotely correct. Most computers that were affected by the fault needed physical remediation via safe mode boot to fix the issue because they were not able to download a fix because of being stuck in a reboot loop. The understanding is that for most cases, the fix needed to be applied by an IT technician dispatched to physically access the computer. A week or 168 hours later, there are still many, many computers out there that remain bricked by this fault because it is so heinously difficult to fix.
- Retr0id 2y agoSee the sentence I wrote just after that one.
- simiones 2y agoHow is it someone other than CrowdStrike's fault that the systems failed again at every reboot until someone with physical access and know-how deleted the crashing driver manually from recovery mode? What should a company operating, say, an MRI machine protected by CrowdStrike have done to recover access in a reasonable amount of time?
- Retr0id 2y agoCrowdStrike's software should not be installed on an MRI machine, per CrowdStrike's own guidance: "Neither the offerings nor crowdstrike tools are for use in the operation of [...] direct or indirect life-support systems [...] or any application or installation where failure could result in death, severe physical injury, or property damage." https://www.crowdstrike.com/terms-conditions/ https://www.crowdstrike.com/terms-conditions/
- fabian2k 2y agoIf the PC controlling an MRI crashes nothing will happen to the instrument itself. The data might be lost and you can't continue using the MRI until this is fixed, but not more. This would not violate these guidelines.
- jeffrallen 2y agoIt should not be your vendor that triggers your disaster recovery plans. It should be you know, a disaster, that does.