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1. That the legislative stranglehold on the eu and other bodies by this country is so strong that they do next to nothing to criticise/sanction israel despite l

1. That the legislative stranglehold on the eu and other bodies by this country is so strong that they do next to nothing to criticise/sanction israel despite literally being hacked by them? Post-pegasus as well. 2. This states lack of care and oftentimes facilitation of these groups, and their close ties to its military 3. The sense of neo mccarthyism that this creates with the idea of constant surveilance through these types of vulnerabilities. I'm full of ideas tonight Same problem, but different lens and conception, and the circumstances and differences are >very< worth disucssing Seriously, let's start talking about those points in this thread

alephnerd 2y ago
The article talks about a German MEP who was most likely targeted by Hungarian intelligence [0] due to his very vocal anti-Orban stance and how he was recently pushing against Hungary and Orban after his recent visits to Russia. The perpetrator was most likely Hungarian intelligence who used a product they bought from an Israeli company. Imo, the bigger question is why Hungary, Poland, Spain, Greece, and Cyprus (all countries part of the recent EU Spyware Scandal) [1] continue to allow their Interior Ministries to attack the phones of both domestic and foreign opponents. [0] - https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/orban-critic-mep-targeted-with-spyware/ https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/orban-c... [1] - https://www.politico.eu/article/parliament-defense-subcommittee-phones-checked-for-spyware/ https://www.politico.eu/article/parliament-defense-subcommit...
bawolff 2y ago
Or alternatively, there isn't really any evidence that the Israeli government was involved in this, which is probably why its not getting very much flak for this. Maybe you could make the argument there should be better export restrictions on private companies to treat so called "cyber-weapons" like real weapons. There are a bunch of efforts on this front. You kind of have to have the treaties in place before you can start exerting diplomatic pressure in regards to them. There are plenty of people working on that, but the wheels of the UN move slowly. Anyways, this particular incident doesn't change much in that regard. For 3, i dont really think this incident (a failed hacking attempt of a type that is pretty typical) really changes or says anything about constant surveilence. We are already way into the era of constant surveilence.
- dunekid 2y ago
  >Maybe you could make the argument there should be better export restrictions on private companies to treat so called "cyber-weapons" like real weapons. As far as what is known with NSO group, Israel does categorize and control the cyber weapons as weapons, and have restrictions in place. But those restrictions are not based on any ethical code, rather only if the said client is not against or subservient to the interests of the State of Israel. Just like it does with IMI exports.

alephnerd 2y ago

The article talks about a German MEP who was most likely targeted by Hungarian intelligence [0] due to his very vocal anti-Orban stance and how he was recently pushing against Hungary and Orban after his recent visits to Russia. The perpetrator was most likely Hungarian intelligence who used a product they bought from an Israeli company. Imo, the bigger question is why Hungary, Poland, Spain, Greece, and Cyprus (all countries part of the recent EU Spyware Scandal) [1] continue to allow their Interior Ministries to attack the phones of both domestic and foreign opponents. [0] - https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/orban-critic-mep-targeted-with-spyware/ https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/orban-c... [1] - https://www.politico.eu/article/parliament-defense-subcommittee-phones-checked-for-spyware/ https://www.politico.eu/article/parliament-defense-subcommit...

bawolff 2y ago

Or alternatively, there isn't really any evidence that the Israeli government was involved in this, which is probably why its not getting very much flak for this. Maybe you could make the argument there should be better export restrictions on private companies to treat so called "cyber-weapons" like real weapons. There are a bunch of efforts on this front. You kind of have to have the treaties in place before you can start exerting diplomatic pressure in regards to them. There are plenty of people working on that, but the wheels of the UN move slowly. Anyways, this particular incident doesn't change much in that regard. For 3, i dont really think this incident (a failed hacking attempt of a type that is pretty typical) really changes or says anything about constant surveilence. We are already way into the era of constant surveilence.

dunekid 2y ago
>Maybe you could make the argument there should be better export restrictions on private companies to treat so called "cyber-weapons" like real weapons. As far as what is known with NSO group, Israel does categorize and control the cyber weapons as weapons, and have restrictions in place. But those restrictions are not based on any ethical code, rather only if the said client is not against or subservient to the interests of the State of Israel. Just like it does with IMI exports.