I agree with you entirely that intuition constitutes fairly weak evidence of something being true, and isn't the sort of thing we should view as a source of dat

I agree with you entirely that intuition constitutes fairly weak evidence of something being true, and isn't the sort of thing we should view as a source of data for empirical methods, unless we're studying the intuition itself as a cultural or cognitive phenomenon. Intuition can be hijacked, it can be dead wrong, and it can notice things but completely misunderstand their mechanism. Otherwise, why do science at all? But the existence of an intuitive belief is also not good evidence against what that belief claims, either! I think scientists have in a few important situations found themselves encountering pushback where methodical empirical study comes to counter-intuitive conclusions, and the culture of science got itself trapped in a schizmogenesis feedback loop where results that sounded counterintuitive were seen as more scientifically sound merely on that basis (and, probably, because counterintuitive findings sound harder to do and thus more impressive). I think this is starting to course-correct, with terms like "boring science" (empirical tests which confirm an intuitive hypothesis) and "cultural evolution" (which some people use to prove too much, but the most solid form of the argument is basically that a commonly-held but illegible belief is something we should treat as a weak signal suggesting a potential truth rather than a negative one) becoming popular Culture is an insidious force we should have tools for pushing back against, but it really throws the baby out with the bathwater to assume that no one who doesn't do rigorous methodological empiricism can come to know something, and that all such knowledge is necessarily backwards and stupid. Even a hypothetically perfect methodological empiricist who must justify all conclusions with legible evidence and repeatable methodology should treat an illegible belief as merely holding no evidentiary weight, not weight against that which is believed