4 ms·
So caveat that I am not a small business in need of any of this stuff, but I'll give you an example of the kinds of things that I have struggled with in the pas
by jmole 2y ago
So caveat that I am not a small business in need of any of this stuff, but I'll give you an example of the kinds of things that I have struggled with in the past where I think a solution like this could add a lot of value if extended in the right ways:
- certificate management amongst a plethora of hosts, both SSL/web certificates for external use, and management and installation of self-signed "root" certs for validating internal applications and services
- keymastering server: an appliance that acts as a genuine root of trust for an organization, using a Yubico HSM for key storage, but providing middleware & admin controls to manage issuance and distribution of intermediate certificates
- AD/LDAP/SSO/etc user management, key issuance, etc.
If you have a small team and you don't need global redundancy for these functions across a large fleet, then it makes a lot of sense IMO to shell out $5-10k for a set it and forget it security appliance that makes certificate/key management simple and easy.
I think the biggest challenge is that it's hard to build trust as a startup without open-sourcing your stack, but that makes it a lot harder to get buy-in for an appliance model unless you have some creative dual-licensing ideas.
But "your keys/certs are stored securely on your hardware in the room next door" is a compelling value proposition & probably a much easier pill to swallow for certain companies than a cloud HSM or other solutions which sorta boil down to "trust me bro".
- packetlost 2y agoSure, so focus on being a local certificate authority using hardware backed roots. I can see that being valuable, but you'd be competing against companies like Smallstep.
- elevation 2y ago> using a Yubico HSM for key storage, but providing middleware & admin controls > a compelling value proposition I completely agree; I'd originally drawn up a design for an offline root CA, then an box with a separate server for an intermediate CA with HSM for intermediate keys, a second, dedicated Secure NTP server (possibly hardware based) so that certificate expiration times could be kept short. While all that is easy enough to prototype, the complexity of hardware distribution is better left to a later point in the roadmap.
- amluto 2y agoI wouldn’t use the Yubico HSM, because I think it misses a feature that would IMO add considerable value: an enforced CT-style log. If I were paying for a corporate root of trust, I would want very strong auditability. Set it up so that the HSM does not release a signature until presented with an SCT. Make it impossible for buggy or compromised host software to create bad certificates without being detected. A hardware HSM is not magic or even especially complex. Java cards can do it (slowly). Yubikeys can do it. Other vendors’ devices can do it. Lots of microcontrollers can do it as long as you don’t need resistance to complex physical attack. A startup in this space should seriously consider building its own.
- elevation 2y agoDo you have a recommended vendor that could be made to support hardware signed CT type logs?