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crowdstrike is caused by over-regulation, not under-regulation. no competent management team would voluntarily install a kernel module for remote surveillance
by kragen 2y ago
crowdstrike is caused by over-regulation, not under-regulation. no competent management team would voluntarily install a kernel module for remote surveillance and exfiltration of all their sensitive data, which is what crowdstrike does when it's working properly; it's only a thing at all because the pci guidelines mandate it
the places where the crowdstrike disaster results in additional regulation will not only be dystopically oppressive as howard predicts; they will also cause themselves additional infosec disasters
george kurtz, ceo and founder of crowdstrike, was the cto of mcafee when they did the exact same thing 14 years ago: https://old.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/1e78l0g/can_crowdstrike_survive_this_impact/ldz4n6h/?share_id=rafKW0OThY1VGL08GtbWb https://old.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/1e78l0g/can_crowd... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Kurtz https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Kurtz
- surgical_fire 2y ago> crowdstrike is caused by over-regulation, not under-regulation. This is laughably wrong. Tech is notoriously under-regulated. Crowdstrike is caused by bad regulation. Somewhat common, as regulatory bodies are typically not well versed in tech to properly regulate it.
- kragen 2y agonot all regulation is bad regulation, but all regulation contains some percentage of bad regulation. you can't have more regulation without more bad regulation. sometimes that's still good on net there are a lot of people who think 'tech is under-regulated', which is to say, more regulation would probably overall improve 'tech'. that point of view is implausible in light of regulatorily-induced disasters like this
- surgical_fire 2y ago> but all regulation contains some percentage of bad regulation Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. I know plenty of regulation that has no bad regulation within. Case in point, I happen to work in the financial sector. The financial sector regulation tends to be, generally speaking, quite good. > there are a lot of people who think 'tech is under-regulated', which is to say, more regulation would probably overall improve 'tech'. that point of view is implausible in light of regulatorily-induced disasters like this Tech absolutely should be more regulated, especially given the abuse of all the major players in the field.
- Nemo_bis 2y ago> Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence Saying that a human activity (regulation) makes a non-zero amount of mistakes hardly seems an extraordinary claim. It is extraordinary to claim that there are zero mistakes in financial regulation. Please supply your proof of the negative.
- surgical_fire 2y ago> Saying that a human activity (regulation) makes a non-zero amount of mistakes hardly seems an extraordinary claim That was not the claim however. The claim was that "all regulation contain bad regulation", which is a broad unqualified statement aimed at throwing a shadow upon regulation. The kind of bullshit regurgitated by libertarian types that think any regulation is icky. As for financial regulation, all regulation to ensure that banks have enough liquidity to add robustness to the system are good. Things such as KYC and AML are also generally good (which was my statement by the way). They may over time be improved, but anyone would be hard pressed to argue they should be removed for being bad.
- kragen 2y agoif kyc and aml, very controversial regulations pushed by the 'intelligence community' which couldn't be successfully imposed until the 9/11 attacks, are your example of uncontroversially good regulations, it seems likely that it will be difficult indeed to find a regulation you can be convinced is bad
- BrandoElFollito 2y agoDo you work in SecOps? Do you manage the security of thousands and thousands of end user devices with actual users? If so you should be grateful for ways to have actual visibility (and possibly blocking) of dangerous activity on the machine. Before EDRs we were blind. EDRs could be better, cheaper, more integrated (that part is not too bad) but saying that PCI-DSS is the only reason for them is disinformation (or lack of actual experience with SecOps)
- rho138 2y agoYou’re not going to get through the pitckfork mobs, silent reservation is the only winning move for us while the masses use this as a moment to point and say “see, finally, I told you _this_ would happen.”
- BrandoElFollito 2y agoI know, but this is infuriating. I am the first to point to dumb decisions, usually Gartner-based, to buy the "top right quadrant" software when much better is available. However, using them would require knowledge and understanding of your needs and not being backed by an army of consultants. And then there is the useful software to buy. A good EDR is one of them. You have nothing on the open-source market (which I use a lot, supporting the developers through whatever they put in place) and CS is very good. They fucked up great this time but it is fortunately a reversible fuck-up. Not the one where you need to reinstall or you lost data (the latter is less certain, but at least for end users this is not the case). People who are bigots of one of the extremes ("open source is not professional software" or "commercial software is a scam") do not work in other's worlds. I can be proud of my home lab (I am) but it will not scale to the 500,000 devices I deal with at work. I know that what I am doing makes sense on my laptop, but this is far, far from being the case with the 60,000 users who do stupid things. One day in the world of the "enemy" would change a lot of minds.
- kragen 2y agoi can't believe i'm writing a reply to a guy whose name is broken spanish for 'brando, the little fuck'. (literally. there isn't an alternative interpretation.) brando, you've got a lot of nerve touting the superiority of secops and edrs on the day when they caused the worst it outage in history, temporarily crippling the global economy in a way worse than any infosec attack secops has ever stopped centralizing the security of thousands and thousands of end-user devices in the hands of a small team is a recipe for disaster, even if it didn't come with continuous exfiltration of sensitive data from those devices, and that disaster has finally struck. you, by which i mean secops, have done more damage yesterday than all the attackers in history, and the nature of the disaster demonstrates that it could have been enormously worse — and will be next time. i don't care what makes your job easier. you shouldn't be doing that job at all. it's a worthless, destructive job that makes everyone less secure this is not monday-morning quarterbacking on my part, either; i happen to have posted this comment 7 days ago (6 days before the disaster) lamenting infosec spending "going to useless or counterproductive measures like crowdstrike" https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40951278 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40951278