> Okay, so by my understanding, now the goalposts are all the way out to being unable to capture the count of enemies but being able to verify the count? I don

> Okay, so by my understanding, now the goalposts are all the way out to being unable to capture the count of enemies but being able to verify the count? I don't think the goalposts have moved, at least for me. I've always had them set at Mozilla not turning any info over to advertisers. They spout a mathematical formalism (differential privacy) so I point out that a better formalism (Shannon secrecy) already existed 70 years earlier and they should stay with it. > If you want Mozilla to stop shipping potentially privacy-affecting changes without consent or notification, I'm in agreement with you. But the actual system they describe and their reasoning for implementing it is, in my mind, relatively sound. "Without consent or notification" is more misdirection, since they did give notice and arguably obtained consent, knowing perfectly well that almost nobody actually reads the notifications and conditions, and instead uses the defaults. If they have default opt-out and a true affirmative opt-in then that is more acceptable. We went through this with email spam more than a decade ago, and currently acceptable practice is DOUBLE opt-in. > But the actual system they describe and their reasoning for implementing it is, in my mind, relatively sound. I can believe that in technical terms, their system does what it says it does. Their reasoning for implementing it is that it brings in money, and that reasoning is probably sound too (i.e. it really does bring in money). Their reasoning that it preserves user privacy is self-serving and obnoxious. They too successfully obfuscate how real privacy protection would work.