3 ms·

> This means the phone can be imaged, then brute-forced on a server. No, it cannot be, which is what I'm saying in my comment. You cannot clone "secure enclav

> This means the phone can be imaged, then brute-forced on a server. No, it cannot be, which is what I'm saying in my comment. You cannot clone "secure enclaves." They are hardware mechanisms, not software. Additionally, things like secure-enclaves have made pin length/commonality being a significant risk factor largely a thing of the past. If you only have ten tries, you will likely miss the correct pin, no matter the statistical likelihood you might find it.

OutOfHere 2y ago
I find the security of the secure enclave to be a bit overrated. It sounds too good to be true. Ultimately, the phone has disk storage. Once the disk is imaged, the secure enclave can be simulated in software, also without the limitation of the number of tries. Only the password is missing.
- bangaladore 2y ago
  > Once the disk is imaged, the secure enclave can be simulated in software, also without the limitation of the number of tries. Only the password is missing. Yes, good luck breaking a 256-bit or similar key. I'll see you and your quantum computer in 2.29*10^32 years
- fragmede 2y ago
  The disk storage is encrypted with a key and not the password directly, so you're not guessing a PIN/password with that method, you're trying to guess the decryption key. The key is impractically harder to brute force with current technology - even a million dollar of AWS spend won't do it. If you're interested in the crypto(graphy) used, Apple has a white paper, among other resources that makes this "too good to be true" anything but.
  - bangaladore 2y ago
    More than likely, a quantum computer over many times the age of the universe won't do it.
  - salawat 2y ago
    If you're talking T2...[0] Glossary entry: >Unique ID (UID) A 256-bit AES key that’s burned into each processor at manufacture. It can’t be read by firmware or software, and is used only by the T2 chip’s hardware AES engine. To obtain the actual key, an attacker would have to mount a highly sophisticated and expensive physical attack against the processor’s silicon. The UID isn’t related to any other identifier on the device including, but not limited to, the UDID. Directly contradicts >Because the UID is unique to each device and is generated wholly within the Secure Enclave rather than in a manufacturing system outside of the device, the UID key isn’t available for access or storage by Apple or any Apple suppliers. on page 5. In cases of ambiguity, I always assume the case least favorable to the end consumer, which is the case whereby there is a database somewhere someone is not willing/able to admit to for fear of burning all the muggle goodwill to ground. Tis much easier to lie and force someone else to prove you wrong as long as you don't show the strength you have without having a plausible alternative explanation; it's one of the oldest techniques in the King's Game. We also know this by another name: parallel construction. That old turkey shows up in DEA training materials; no need to even reach as far as the Intelligence Community/Military Industrial Complex. [0]https://www.apple.com/mideast/mac/docs/Apple_T2_Security_Chip_Overview.pdf https://www.apple.com/mideast/mac/docs/Apple_T2_Security_Chi...

OutOfHere 2y ago

I find the security of the secure enclave to be a bit overrated. It sounds too good to be true. Ultimately, the phone has disk storage. Once the disk is imaged, the secure enclave can be simulated in software, also without the limitation of the number of tries. Only the password is missing.

bangaladore 2y ago
> Once the disk is imaged, the secure enclave can be simulated in software, also without the limitation of the number of tries. Only the password is missing. Yes, good luck breaking a 256-bit or similar key. I'll see you and your quantum computer in 2.29*10^32 years
fragmede 2y ago
The disk storage is encrypted with a key and not the password directly, so you're not guessing a PIN/password with that method, you're trying to guess the decryption key. The key is impractically harder to brute force with current technology - even a million dollar of AWS spend won't do it. If you're interested in the crypto(graphy) used, Apple has a white paper, among other resources that makes this "too good to be true" anything but.
- bangaladore 2y ago
  More than likely, a quantum computer over many times the age of the universe won't do it.
- salawat 2y ago
  If you're talking T2...[0] Glossary entry: >Unique ID (UID) A 256-bit AES key that’s burned into each processor at manufacture. It can’t be read by firmware or software, and is used only by the T2 chip’s hardware AES engine. To obtain the actual key, an attacker would have to mount a highly sophisticated and expensive physical attack against the processor’s silicon. The UID isn’t related to any other identifier on the device including, but not limited to, the UDID. Directly contradicts >Because the UID is unique to each device and is generated wholly within the Secure Enclave rather than in a manufacturing system outside of the device, the UID key isn’t available for access or storage by Apple or any Apple suppliers. on page 5. In cases of ambiguity, I always assume the case least favorable to the end consumer, which is the case whereby there is a database somewhere someone is not willing/able to admit to for fear of burning all the muggle goodwill to ground. Tis much easier to lie and force someone else to prove you wrong as long as you don't show the strength you have without having a plausible alternative explanation; it's one of the oldest techniques in the King's Game. We also know this by another name: parallel construction. That old turkey shows up in DEA training materials; no need to even reach as far as the Intelligence Community/Military Industrial Complex. [0]https://www.apple.com/mideast/mac/docs/Apple_T2_Security_Chip_Overview.pdf https://www.apple.com/mideast/mac/docs/Apple_T2_Security_Chi...