The Chevron Doctrine carried with it a two-step process for judges assessing vagaries in laws: 1. Is it vague about legal matters? For example, does the law se

The Chevron Doctrine carried with it a two-step process for judges assessing vagaries in laws: 1. Is it vague about legal matters? For example, does the law seem to allow government agents to search somebody's house without good cause or notice? Then the judge, being an expert in law, should make the call. 2. If not 1, then it seems to be a subject matter vagary. For example (pulling from the dissent), is the Gray Squirrel population in the Pacific Northwest distinct enough from other Gray Squirrel populations in the US to qualify for protection? Should this be determined by geography, genetics, ecosystem similarity? How could we expect a judge to wisely rule on this unless they also have an advanced degree in biology and ecology? Chevron recognized that matters of law should be decided by judges, but also accepts that we don't have idealized judges who always have perfect understanding. I expect we'll soon see glaring examples of imperfect (a.k.a., human) judges soon.