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I feel like your response simply reinforces my point: > The interior experience of somebody who vehemently denies the hard problem must be so much different fr

I feel like your response simply reinforces my point: > The interior experience of somebody who vehemently denies the hard problem must be so much different from my interior experience to the extend that the divide can't be bridged. The hard problem deals with "why" there's a subjective interior experience to begin with, not the nature of that subjective experience. And when I say "the interior experience of somebody who vehemently denies the hard problem" I don't mean your experience of qualia and such (e.g. your perceptive experience). I mean your core internal experience of being a conscious entity MUST be dramatically different.

naasking 2y ago
> I mean your core internal experience of being a conscious entity MUST be dramatically different. Sorry, I still don't agree. I found it equally hard to understand eliminativism until I reframed what I was perceiving in terms of my knowledge. This is not a question of the "experience" being different, this is a matter of what reliable information I'm extracting from the "experience". Ask yourself why you don't naively accept that water breaks pencils [1]. It's because you don't take your perceptions at face value, but instead interpret them within a consistent body of knowledge that we call science, which tells you that water refracts light. You and I still both perceive the broken pencil, but we know that's not what's really happening. Analogously, we are both perceiving what we call "qualitative experience", I'm just interpreting this within a consistent body of knowledge that we call science, and concluding that this perception is faulty, and that that's not really what's going on. So it's not the perception itself that causes us to reach different conclusions about what's going on, it's that external information that is demonstrably more reliable is telling a different story. [1] https://scienceathomekids.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/IMG_9251-2048x1536.jpg https://scienceathomekids.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/IMG...
- naasking 2y ago
  > and concluding that this perception is faulty I should qualify that with "probably faulty". There's always room for expanding the ontology of science, but it has to be very well motivated, a standard which I don't think has been met for qualia.

naasking 2y ago

> I mean your core internal experience of being a conscious entity MUST be dramatically different. Sorry, I still don't agree. I found it equally hard to understand eliminativism until I reframed what I was perceiving in terms of my knowledge. This is not a question of the "experience" being different, this is a matter of what reliable information I'm extracting from the "experience". Ask yourself why you don't naively accept that water breaks pencils [1]. It's because you don't take your perceptions at face value, but instead interpret them within a consistent body of knowledge that we call science, which tells you that water refracts light. You and I still both perceive the broken pencil, but we know that's not what's really happening. Analogously, we are both perceiving what we call "qualitative experience", I'm just interpreting this within a consistent body of knowledge that we call science, and concluding that this perception is faulty, and that that's not really what's going on. So it's not the perception itself that causes us to reach different conclusions about what's going on, it's that external information that is demonstrably more reliable is telling a different story. [1] https://scienceathomekids.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/IMG_9251-2048x1536.jpg https://scienceathomekids.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/IMG...

naasking 2y ago
> and concluding that this perception is faulty I should qualify that with "probably faulty". There's always room for expanding the ontology of science, but it has to be very well motivated, a standard which I don't think has been met for qualia.