Certainly if it was downgraded only by the time it reached phase 6, then I would expect it to have gone through that higher scrutiny in earlier phases (includin

Certainly if it was downgraded only by the time it reached phase 6, then I would expect it to have gone through that higher scrutiny in earlier phases (including lab testing). My guess is that the existing lab testing was inadequate for surfacing issues that would only appear at production-scale. If each of the six phases was a distinct set of config changes, then they really shouldn't have been bundled as part of the same network upgrade with the same risk assessment. But, charitably, I assumed that this was a progressive rollout in some form (my guess was different device roles, e.g. peering devices vs backbone routers). Should these device roles have been qualified separately via lab testing and more? Certainly. Were they? I have no idea. Do I think there are systemic issues with how Rogers runs their network? Almost certainly. But from my perspective, the report (which was created by an external third-party) places too much blame on the downgrade of risk assessment as opposed to other underlying issues. (As you can see, there is a lot of guesswork on my behalf, precisely because, as you mention, there isn't enough information in the executive summary to fill in these gaps.)