Thanks for the response! But your syllogism seems to be different that the one presented in the linked article that attempted to summarize Chalmer's logic. I d

Thanks for the response! But your syllogism seems to be different that the one presented in the linked article that attempted to summarize Chalmer's logic. I don't contest your point 1 at all -- I believe in most of there universe there is no consciousness, and for much of Earth's history there was no consciousness here either. For point 2 -- perhaps "logically possible" is a term of art that I'm not familiar with, so I am perhaps missing the point. But on a plain reading I can't support this point. Recycling a point I made earlier, I can conceive of a world where the center of the sun is made of chocolate, but it is not logically possible. Point 3 -- the conclusion you have arrived at isn't contested. Materialists are not claiming consciousness is the cause of the physical processes, rather it is the result of them. As I said in my response to point 1, much of earth's history didn't have any conscious experiencers. We could say: (1) we can conceive of the physical dynamics of this world occurring without waterfalls. (2) if something is conceivable then it is logically possible (3) It is logically possible that the physical dynamics of this world occur without any associated waterfalls. I don't see what insight this syllogism is presenting: one can imagine a world where the set of actually realized manifestations of physical laws is different, but it doesn't speak to whether the unmanifested things are not present because they are non-physical (at least in part).