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1Password and 2FA: Is it wrong to store passwords and one-time codes together? (2023)
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- mt42or 2y agoIt is really a bad article. Instead of making things easy to understand it makes things more complex. Factors are : Knowledge (password), Inherence (biometrics) & Possession (device). If you have multiple same factor it remains single factor. 1password itself is only one factor for authentication whatever they offer (password, totp, passkey).
- Skunkleton 2y agoThat's not correct, at least depending on your threat model. Having a password stored + totp in a password manager does give the advantage of protecting you against the loss of the stored password itself. Specifically with 1password I have all three factors you've mentioned above. 1) knowledge - my vault password is memorized, 2) inherence (?) - biometrics used to unlock the vault on trusted devices, 3) possession - my account requires a security key to unlock.
- adastra22 2y ago...how? Loss of the stored password would mean loss of the TOTP too.
- coldtea 2y agoSay I store a password for service X on 1P. The password becomes known to attackers somehow. That doesn't mean they have access to my TOTP for the service, even if it's managed by the 1P app. Loss of 1P's password/key would indeed also mean loss of my TOTP. But then one would have much bigger problems anyway, except if all their 1P passwords also had an external TOTP.
- microtonal 2y agoThe password becomes known to attackers somehow. Let's work through the scenarios: - Eavesdropping on you, doesn't happen because you use the password manager's autofill. - Hacking service X, TOTP doesn't matter. They'll have the TOTP shared secret, but who cares anyway, they have access to your whole account. - Using the same password across sites -> shouldn't happen either, this is why you are using a password manager. - Phishing: while they cannot access your TOTP secret, they can just ask you a TOTP code while phishing as well and log onto your account. So what is this scenario where an attacker knows your password, needs your TOTP, but doesn't have it? The primary scenario I can think of is where they somehow compromised your password manager, but you stored your TOTP secrets on a separate, uncompromised device (like your phone).
- coldtea 2y ago>- Eavesdropping on you, doesn't happen because you use the password manager's autofill Not necessarily always, I could also copy paste from the password manager (e.g. for some app that doesn't support the autofill), write it from memory at some point, and so on. Password manager just means "place to store passwords safely", it doesn't mandate the passwords are generated by it, that autofill and browser extensions are used, and so on. >- Hacking service X, TOTP doesn't matter. They'll have the TOTP shared secret, but who cares anyway, they have access to your whole account. They can (and often do) hack and get the passwords, but not at the same time have access to the account data. E.g. just hack the auth, or have the password file/db leak, etc. >- Using the same password across sites -> shouldn't happen either, this is why you are using a password manager. Doesn't matter, can still happen anyway. Not all passwords were created with the password manager, and some someone might not have bothered to change once he added them there. >- Phishing: while they cannot access your TOTP secret, they can just ask you a TOTP code while phishing as well and log onto your account. That's still about them not having and needing your TOTP. >So what is this scenario where an attacker knows your password, needs your TOTP, but doesn't have it? For starters, the case where they "ask you a TOTP code while phishing" and you don't give it to them. It's not mandatory that you're prone to their phishing.
- jackweirdy 2y ago
- gregoryl 2y agoOnly if the vault is cracked. If it's intercepted somehow, or pulled from a database dump, the 2FA token will still be secure.
- adastra22 2y agoI don't see those as realistic. Session interception largely isn't a thing anymore, unless we're talking about nation-state levels of attackers, and if the service is storing your password unhashed then I sincerely doubt their 2FA is configured in a secure way anyway.
- jackweirdy 2y agoI think it’s not a nation state actor thing. In 2018 British airways checkout got popped by a JavaScript being library being changed to eavesdrop credit cards. The same thing could easily happen with password forms Granted they didn’t break the session in flight, but there is a low bar to achieve the same thing
- eschatology 2y agoif your network is compromised I can read your password but not totp if I hacked a website you’re registered to and you had reused your password I got your password but not totp if I broke through your computer and password manager then yes it’s all over, but this is not the only threat model and frankly the least i am worried about
- nucleardog 2y ago> if your network is compromised I can read your password but not totp What part of my network? The password is being encrypted in my browser, sent over an encrypted and authenticated connection, and decrypted by the service I’m logging in to. The only real place to compromise here is before the “browser sends this to SSL library” part in which case you’re already on my local machine and you can just grab everything in my password manager when I unlock it. > if I hacked a website you’re registered to and you had reused your password I got your password but not totp If you’re not using a password manager and a different password for each service, then yes, using TOTP provides a large security benefit. If you’re using a password manager it is probably specifically to avoid password re-use, so this doesn’t apply in most cases. > if I broke through your computer and password manager then yes it’s all over, but this is not the only threat model and frankly the least i am worried about If you’re on my computer, yeah, you’ve got both and the TOTP, they do nothing. So there’s no scenario here where “password manager for passwords + TOTP” is decreasing my risks in any meaningful way.
- goupil 2y agoIf your 1password is compromised, then loss of the password would mean loss of the TOTP, in which case TOTP doesn't help. But there are other scenarios where your password could be stolen without someone getting access to your 1password, for instance if your connection isn't protected and a man in the middle can intercept your password. In the end, I would argue that having TOTP in the same place as your password is weaker than having it somewhere else, but it's still better than no 2FA
- microtonal 2y agoBut there are other scenarios where your password could be stolen without someone getting access to your 1password, for instance if your connection isn't protected and a man in the middle can intercept your password. Then they could also intercept your TOTP code, which is valid for a pretty long time by default (remember that the TOTP code is accepted for some time after the counter goes to 0 to account for transmission delays, slightly out of sync clocks, etc.) and use that to log into your account. TOTP does not protect against modern forms of phishing. You need something like FIDO2.
- antonellaleo 2y ago[dead]
- goupil 2y agoThat's a very valid point, as an automated attack could then be performed. I guess it would at least help against an attacker that would be manually checking what's inside the packets captured, or that would let his attack passively capture everything for a while and then proceed to attack.
- tempestn 2y agoAnother one would be a password change attack. TOTP in 1pw protects you against almost all of the things TOTP normally would, except an attacker somehow gaining access to your vault. But in order to gain access to your vault, they would almost certainly need access to one of your unlocked devices, thanks to the 1pw secret key, which is required in addition to your master pw to unlock the vault on a new device. And if they have that, thrn they would have your second factor even if it were in a separate app.
- microtonal 2y agoHaving a password stored + totp in a password manager does give the advantage of protecting you against the loss of the stored password itself. Which becomes far less relevant when using a password manager, because people don't reuse passwords anymore. Password managers also autofill, so eavesdropping on a password is also not possible anymore. One of the primary vectors for compromising passwords is compromising the password manager, which would also compromise the TOTP codes if they were in the password manager. You have much stronger protection against that if your TOTP codes are stored on a separate device. That said, TOTP is also pretty terrible because does not really protect against phishing (just make a phishing site proxy both credentials). Hardware keys are the only really secure solution if you consider password manager compromise as part of your threat model. Remember that password managers are comprisable, just look at LassPass' history.
- leftcenterright 2y ago> For the majority of people, storing TOTP in 1Password is well within their risk tolerance. There will always be those of you who will trade that convenience because you want or require the added protection of true 2FA. And to those faithful hardware key crew members: Think of your true second factor as less “extra layer of security,” and more granular protection that will apply only if you’re subject to certain forms of attack. this is the crux really. Especially when a web based password manager is in use [0], this is not at all within risk tolerance for people really striving for a long-term threat model which they do not need to revisit every couple of years. Buying multiple hardware tokens and keeping one authenticator/TOTP app on phone is very practical the best you can do and it is secure, loss-proof and will last for a long time. Most services allow you to add multiple types of 2FA devices. 0. https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/passmgrs.html https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/passmgrs.html
- weinzierl 2y agoSay, I want to go the extra mile of not storing them together. What would I have to do? - Both in same password manager is obviously storing together. - Both on same phone, but different apps. There are the subvariants of: password manager and dedicated OTP app or two different password managers. Also there is the consideration where the apps really store the secret data, e.g. system provided vault - OTP on a separate device I think the middle option has too many ifs and buts and you could argue that as long as its the same device it's not really separate. So dedicated OTP token. What should I use? Cheap mobile phone? Does it need a SIM? Are there dedicated devices? Can they store multiple keys?
- piperswe 2y agoYubikeys support OTPs, you can configure and read them using the Yubico Authenticator application on desktop/mobile.
- steve1977 2y agoTo expand on that (for those who might not know), the actual secrets are physically on the Yubikey and the Authenticator app on iOS or Android is using them to generate the One-Time Password. This means you can also roam those secrets to different devices (as they are on the Yubikey). But it also means that you need to have access to the key whenever you need the OTP! One caveat is that you can "only" have 32 or 64 accounts per Yubikey (number depending on the version of the key)
- graftak 2y agoThat number has to be so big I’d be absolutely confident to never exceed it before ever considering it. Nobody has time to manage/backup multiple keys with the fun game of ‘what account is stored on which key’.
- lye 2y agoEither a couple of FIDO keys, if your website supports them, or one of these: https://www.token2.com/shop/category/classic-tokens https://www.token2.com/shop/category/classic-tokens https://www.token2.com/shop/category/c301-tokens https://www.token2.com/shop/category/c301-tokens https://www.token2.com/shop/category/multi-profile-programmable-tokens https://www.token2.com/shop/category/multi-profile-programma... Other vendors probably have something like that, I link to what I've personally used.
- CPLX 2y agoEveryone is talking about threat models but like the actual use case here is some web service that doesn’t matter very much that you use sometimes and if it was compromised that wouldn’t matter either but they make you use some fucking login scheme that adds extra time to your day. Or even more accurately they insist on you using their own proprietary mobile app to get a code which really only exists to track you and make trouble when you log in from a different city or have a VA log in for you, spawning a call from them to try to insist on you buying extra licenses so you find the fine print link that lets you use a TOTP instead and get a few minutes of your life back every time as well as their useless fucking app off your iPhone.
- kemotep 2y agoMultifactor Authentication is having at least two of the following: * Something you know (such as a password) * Something you have (security key, TOTP generator) * Someone you are (biometrics, fingerprint/face id) * Somewhere you are (network or geolocation) Using a password manager app and TOTP generator app on the same phone is clearly a single point of failure and does not add meaningfully to your security compared to just storing the TOTP in the password manager. If your device is compromised the attacker has control of both apps potentially, and very likely the TOTP app does not require an additional password or factor. And unless you use a FIDO2 device for MFA, TOTP is not phishing resistant. You can mitigate these issues though. However, if you require a specific device to access the password manager by one of the following methods: * Offline password manager such as KeepassXC (needing the password database file) * Needing a keyfile (like with KeepassXC or 1Password’s device key) * Needing to be on a specific network such as VPN (when using a self-hosted password manager like Bitwarden and configuring the firewall to be limited to a wireguard network for example) Does this count as an additional possession factor or location factor? And if it counts as a possession factor does it meaningfully increase your security posture to have multiple possession factors beyond a FIDO2 key?
- jorvi 2y ago> Using a password manager app and TOTP generator app on the same phone is clearly a single point of failure and does not add meaningfully to your security compared to just storing the TOTP in the password manager. You are so wrong. You can log into a password manager from the browser. Now you’re completely pwned. Let’s compare it to separated 2FA: they pwn my 1Password, but then how the hell are they going to log into my 2FA app? They’d need to breach the 2FA on my Apple/Google account and then again on my Authy, which in practice will mean either a SIM swap or SS7 attack. Only adept threat actors have access to those techniques. If you just have a pedestrian threat model, store your unimportant 2FA in your password manager, and the really important one’s in a separate 2FA app (2FAS or Authy). 1Password is naturally 2FA by way of its Secret Key system. Boom. Simple and secure.
- kemotep 2y ago> You can log into a password manager from the browser. Now you’re completely pwned. Can you elaborate here? My point was that your phone is a single point of failure if you use it primarily for both your 1password account and your TOTP generator. Compromising the phone gives you access to both apps. And I mention that this can still be mitigated. One of those ways is through adding a password or biometric unlock to your TOTP generator app (as you point out). Or you use a second device like a yubikey. But the point of that paragraph is that combining passwords and totp codes into your password manager is a single point of failure. Separating the passwords and totp but still using just 1 device, can also be a single point of failure.
- FreakLegion 2y agoThese are the main threat models to be aware of: 1. Credential phishing. Where you store your TOTP secret doesn't matter. 2. OAuth phishing. Where you store your TOTP secret doesn't matter. (This also runs right through FIDO and has been growing in popularity for about a decade now: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/d/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks.html https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/d/pawn-storm-ab...) 3. Data breaches. Where you store your TOTP secret doesn't matter unless your password manager backs up online, that's what gets breached, and the data isn't properly encrypted. Which has happened. 4. Malware. Where you store your TOTP secret matters. This is why U2F and FIDO2 have a user presence test, but the real-world value here is overstated. Malware can always just steal your tokens. 5. Physical access. Where you store your TOTP secret matters. If you care about security though you'll have other measures in place to keep someone with physical access out, which is enough against basically anyone except governments. Summary: A "true" second factor doesn't really matter. What matters is deciding which scenarios you care about and making sure you have security you'll actually use given those constraints.
- todotask 2y agoInteresting, how about in the Passkeys scenario where you use biometrics?
- kevincox 2y agoIt helps but isn't perfect. The attacker can't just pick up the secret. With a passkey they would need to trick you into touching it to authenticate them. Probably by timing it when you think you are about to do a regular authentication.
- FreakLegion 2y agoPasskeys are the software version ('platform authenticator') of hardware keys ('roaming authenticator'), so no touching. Biometrics in this case are an attempt in software at something like the user presence test hardware has, but this is an OS-level guard, so the guarantees are much weaker. (Of course you can also have a biometric lock on a hardware key, which would be an improvement under the physical access threat model.)
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- orev 2y agoAs is often the case in this discussion, the die hard security people will quote the definition of “true” multi-factor with the standard “at least two of something you ____”, but this level of security isn’t needed for most sites. I find it helpful to think of most “2-step” logins as simply an extension of passwords (one-factor), plus an admission that both users and web sites/apps are completely incapable of following the rules of password management. Users can’t stop reusing passwords, and web sites can’t properly store them and avoid getting hacked. 2 step logins are a method to force users to use a password that changes every 30 seconds, and that password is unique per web site/app. It shouldn’t be seen as a true multi-factor in the traditional sense.
- outcoldman 2y agoHow much we care about trying as users to keep our accounts secure, the websites aren’t that good to keep our data secure. How many data breaches we had in last 5 years that affected all of us. I feel like at least a few affected me. So in that case storing OTP with passwords or don’t does not matter.