3 ms·

The argument is roughly that (1) we can conceive of the physical dynamics of this world occurring without any associated consciousness, (2) if something is conc

The argument is roughly that (1) we can conceive of the physical dynamics of this world occurring without any associated consciousness, (2) if something is conceivable then it is logically possible, (3) It is logically possible that the physical dynamics of this world occur without any associated consciousness. (1) is supported by noticing that all our explanations of physical dynamics appeals to other physical dynamics. We do not need to mention consciousness or qualitative anything to derive any of the physical dynamics we observe in this world. Thus there is nothing logically incoherent about physical dynamics without consciousness. (2) follows from the fact that logical possibility just means no contradiction. If we cannot see any contradiction in two propositions being true, then that is defeasible evidence for the logical possibility of both propositions being true.

RaftPeople 2y ago
> if something is conceivable then it is logically possible What does it mean to be "logically possible"? We could conceive of something that is pure garbage due to our lack of knowledge. Something that could never exist due to nature of the universe, but just because we can conceive of it does not mean it's a valid and non-contradictory state for the universe. It's possible it's a valid argument from the perspective that it forces us into the corner of stating one of these two conditions must be true: either p-zombies or consciousness requires attributes to our reality that are beyond our current physical understanding.
- hackinthebochs 2y ago
  Logically possible just means there's no contradiction in accepting something as true. Usually it's used in the context of reasoning about what could have been true about the world. If some features of the world are varied, what else has to change to maintain consistency? And sure, plenty of people argue that conceivability is a weak guide to possibility due to our limited knowledge, being imperfect reasoners, etc. That's a fair critique. >either p-zombies or consciousness requires attributes to our reality that are beyond our current physical understanding. To be clear, the impossibility of p-zombies implies that there is some as yet unidentified logical/semantic relationship between physical dynamics and consciousness. This would mean that there is no possible world where the physical dynamics is true but there is no consciousness. The possibility of p-zombies supports the idea that there is some further (non-logical) property of the world that supports consciousness. But such a property could have been false in a world very much like our own; one with all the same physical dynamics just without any consciousness. The p-zombie argument is used to raise the credence of there being a further fact about the world that supports consciousness.
  - chr1 2y ago
    The problem with p-zombie argument is that it is completely inconsequential. It is like if i say there is some property let's call it phi-factor, i am certain i have it, some people have it too, and some do not, but there is absolutely no way for others to tell who has this phi-factor thing and who does not, because it doesn't cause any difference in behavior of people. This kind of hypothesis doesn't explain anything and does not predict anything, and therefore it is not possible to build any logical chain based on it. There are good versions of p-zombie argument, e.g. you could say that it is very hard to find difference in behavior of people and p-zombies, but if you create planet like simulation inhabited with p-zombies they will have large differences, e.g. they will never develop art, or science, or religion, or will die out because will not want to have children. In any case there needs to be some measurable difference in behavior, for argument to be valid. But since this is a normal testable theory, it does not lead to the same kind of self-contradictory statements as p-zombie version, and therefore is not popular with philosophers who want to talk about things they have nothing to say about.
    - hackinthebochs 2y ago
      The argument is not inconsequential, you just need to understand the work the argument is trying to do. If you are only interested in testable hypotheses, then the argument isn't relevant. But that's not the only thing that matters in Science. Science doesn't operate free of assumptions or conceptual frameworks. An experiment is situated within a set of background assumptions that determine what the experiment outcome says about the world. Our conceptual framework for understanding consciousness also matters, and the p-zombie argument is directly relevant to what conceptual framework is a plausible basis for doing a science of consciousness. The zombie argument puts limits on what the brain sciences can say about consciousness as such, i.e. the qualitative feel of subjective experience. The very point of the argument is to elucidate the limits of scientific explanation regarding consciousness. For that it is very consequential.
      - chr1 2y ago
        Could you bring any example where non-testable hypothesis have mattered in science, or even have been proposed? As far as i can tell the p-zombie argument is a variant 2=3 "proofs" with hidden division by 0. People claim as truth a proposition with no consequence,then claim that a proposition they want to prove follows from it. It does not elucidate anything. The limited variant of the argument which predicts something does help in understanding the limits, but p-zombie supporters do not like that argument because it also shows the boundaries of what brain sciences can't say, and that is not much.
tasty_freeze 2y ago
Thanks for the response! But your syllogism seems to be different that the one presented in the linked article that attempted to summarize Chalmer's logic. I don't contest your point 1 at all -- I believe in most of there universe there is no consciousness, and for much of Earth's history there was no consciousness here either. For point 2 -- perhaps "logically possible" is a term of art that I'm not familiar with, so I am perhaps missing the point. But on a plain reading I can't support this point. Recycling a point I made earlier, I can conceive of a world where the center of the sun is made of chocolate, but it is not logically possible. Point 3 -- the conclusion you have arrived at isn't contested. Materialists are not claiming consciousness is the cause of the physical processes, rather it is the result of them. As I said in my response to point 1, much of earth's history didn't have any conscious experiencers. We could say: (1) we can conceive of the physical dynamics of this world occurring without waterfalls. (2) if something is conceivable then it is logically possible (3) It is logically possible that the physical dynamics of this world occur without any associated waterfalls. I don't see what insight this syllogism is presenting: one can imagine a world where the set of actually realized manifestations of physical laws is different, but it doesn't speak to whether the unmanifested things are not present because they are non-physical (at least in part).
- hackinthebochs 2y ago
  >I can conceive of a world where the center of the sun is made of chocolate, but it is not logically possible. How do you know its logically impossible if you can conceive of it? If there's some fact you are aware of that makes it logically impossible, then that means its not conceivable, by the philosophically relevant meaning of the term.

RaftPeople 2y ago

> if something is conceivable then it is logically possible What does it mean to be "logically possible"? We could conceive of something that is pure garbage due to our lack of knowledge. Something that could never exist due to nature of the universe, but just because we can conceive of it does not mean it's a valid and non-contradictory state for the universe. It's possible it's a valid argument from the perspective that it forces us into the corner of stating one of these two conditions must be true: either p-zombies or consciousness requires attributes to our reality that are beyond our current physical understanding.

hackinthebochs 2y ago
Logically possible just means there's no contradiction in accepting something as true. Usually it's used in the context of reasoning about what could have been true about the world. If some features of the world are varied, what else has to change to maintain consistency? And sure, plenty of people argue that conceivability is a weak guide to possibility due to our limited knowledge, being imperfect reasoners, etc. That's a fair critique. >either p-zombies or consciousness requires attributes to our reality that are beyond our current physical understanding. To be clear, the impossibility of p-zombies implies that there is some as yet unidentified logical/semantic relationship between physical dynamics and consciousness. This would mean that there is no possible world where the physical dynamics is true but there is no consciousness. The possibility of p-zombies supports the idea that there is some further (non-logical) property of the world that supports consciousness. But such a property could have been false in a world very much like our own; one with all the same physical dynamics just without any consciousness. The p-zombie argument is used to raise the credence of there being a further fact about the world that supports consciousness.
- chr1 2y ago
  The problem with p-zombie argument is that it is completely inconsequential. It is like if i say there is some property let's call it phi-factor, i am certain i have it, some people have it too, and some do not, but there is absolutely no way for others to tell who has this phi-factor thing and who does not, because it doesn't cause any difference in behavior of people. This kind of hypothesis doesn't explain anything and does not predict anything, and therefore it is not possible to build any logical chain based on it. There are good versions of p-zombie argument, e.g. you could say that it is very hard to find difference in behavior of people and p-zombies, but if you create planet like simulation inhabited with p-zombies they will have large differences, e.g. they will never develop art, or science, or religion, or will die out because will not want to have children. In any case there needs to be some measurable difference in behavior, for argument to be valid. But since this is a normal testable theory, it does not lead to the same kind of self-contradictory statements as p-zombie version, and therefore is not popular with philosophers who want to talk about things they have nothing to say about.
  - hackinthebochs 2y ago
    The argument is not inconsequential, you just need to understand the work the argument is trying to do. If you are only interested in testable hypotheses, then the argument isn't relevant. But that's not the only thing that matters in Science. Science doesn't operate free of assumptions or conceptual frameworks. An experiment is situated within a set of background assumptions that determine what the experiment outcome says about the world. Our conceptual framework for understanding consciousness also matters, and the p-zombie argument is directly relevant to what conceptual framework is a plausible basis for doing a science of consciousness. The zombie argument puts limits on what the brain sciences can say about consciousness as such, i.e. the qualitative feel of subjective experience. The very point of the argument is to elucidate the limits of scientific explanation regarding consciousness. For that it is very consequential.
    - chr1 2y ago
      Could you bring any example where non-testable hypothesis have mattered in science, or even have been proposed? As far as i can tell the p-zombie argument is a variant 2=3 "proofs" with hidden division by 0. People claim as truth a proposition with no consequence,then claim that a proposition they want to prove follows from it. It does not elucidate anything. The limited variant of the argument which predicts something does help in understanding the limits, but p-zombie supporters do not like that argument because it also shows the boundaries of what brain sciences can't say, and that is not much.

tasty_freeze 2y ago

Thanks for the response! But your syllogism seems to be different that the one presented in the linked article that attempted to summarize Chalmer's logic. I don't contest your point 1 at all -- I believe in most of there universe there is no consciousness, and for much of Earth's history there was no consciousness here either. For point 2 -- perhaps "logically possible" is a term of art that I'm not familiar with, so I am perhaps missing the point. But on a plain reading I can't support this point. Recycling a point I made earlier, I can conceive of a world where the center of the sun is made of chocolate, but it is not logically possible. Point 3 -- the conclusion you have arrived at isn't contested. Materialists are not claiming consciousness is the cause of the physical processes, rather it is the result of them. As I said in my response to point 1, much of earth's history didn't have any conscious experiencers. We could say: (1) we can conceive of the physical dynamics of this world occurring without waterfalls. (2) if something is conceivable then it is logically possible (3) It is logically possible that the physical dynamics of this world occur without any associated waterfalls. I don't see what insight this syllogism is presenting: one can imagine a world where the set of actually realized manifestations of physical laws is different, but it doesn't speak to whether the unmanifested things are not present because they are non-physical (at least in part).

hackinthebochs 2y ago
>I can conceive of a world where the center of the sun is made of chocolate, but it is not logically possible. How do you know its logically impossible if you can conceive of it? If there's some fact you are aware of that makes it logically impossible, then that means its not conceivable, by the philosophically relevant meaning of the term.