Nature's full of emergent properties that arise from components lacking those properties. Take snowflakes: complex patterns emerging from basic physical process

Nature's full of emergent properties that arise from components lacking those properties. Take snowflakes: complex patterns emerging from basic physical processes. Strawson argues these aren't analogous to consciousness. He claims other emergent properties can be explained by their constituents' physical properties and arrangements, but consciousness can't be reduced this way. Thing is, Strawson's giving consciousness special treatment. It's basically an argument from incredulity. Our current inability to explain consciousness doesn't make it impossible. This gap in our understanding doesn't justify jumping to radical solutions like panpsychism. Historically, science has explained countless "inexplicable" phenomena through emergent processes. Treating consciousness as a unique case requiring extraordinary explanations goes against the trend of scientific progress. TL;DR: Strawson's making consciousness a special case without sufficient justification. It's premature to assume we need radical solutions just because we can't explain it yet.