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A simple counter-argument to p-zombies that I like (I first encountered from Yudkowski) is: If there was no conscious experience in this identical p-zombie wor
by theptip 2y ago
A simple counter-argument to p-zombies that I like (I first encountered from Yudkowski) is:
If there was no conscious experience in this identical p-zombie world, it would be impossible to explain why everybody falsely claims they have conscious experience. If people stop claiming this, then the world is physically different, as people no longer act and produce artifacts such as HN posts discussing the phenomenon.
Or, my summary would be: conscious experience is causal, and so you cannot get the same universe-wide effects without it.
- naasking 2y agoNot impossible actually. People often claim falsehoods are real, eg. demons, ghosts, deities, etc. If you believe it's possible that p-zombies could generate false beliefs about these other things, then consciousness would just be another falsehood.
- theptip 2y agoYou would need some coordinating mechanism to ensure that all the p-zombies have the same hallucination. Including some detailed state machine that takes sense inputs, and processes it to produce the qualia present in each waking moment, plus the valence attributed to each moment of qualia. Since a non-p-zombie can sit down and interrogate the details of their conscious experience, then write a book about it, which others read and agree upon the fine details - I find it hard to come up with a p-zombie substitute that wouldn’t just be consciousness by another name.
- naasking 2y ago> You would need some coordinating mechanism to ensure that all the p-zombies have the same hallucination You mean like talking and writing? As I said, how would p-zombies invent organized religion or other common spiritual beliefs that are false? > Since a non-p-zombie can sit down and interrogate the details of their conscious experience, then write a book about it, which others read and agree upon the fine details First, assuming you think that we're not p-zombies, not everybody agrees on the properties of consciousness even though we presumably have such an introspective ability. Therefore what you describe is a kind of fictional just-so story, and clearly doesn't actually happen in all cases. Second, when there is no fact of the matter as with p-zombies and consciousness, any argument about consciousness only has to be rhetorically persuasive, not factual. Why do so many people agree on the broad properties of ghosts, eg. translucency, pass through physical objects, etc. despite such things not existing? There is no fact of the matter being described, so people just need to like the story being told, or perhaps how it's told. In such a world, Chalmers and other philosophers of consciousness are just persuasive writers that spin a convincing just-so story connecting fictional internal states to real world observations, and people/p-zombies run with it thinking they learned something meaningful. Suffice it to say, I think this is uncomfortably close to our world.
- enugu 2y agoA well simulated intelligence in a computer would speak and have discussions about 'conscious experience'. (Assuming that is possible, but that is implied by physicalism+Church-Turing) If you think that the simulation has conscious experience/qualia.../X, then X gets properties like being non-localized in space and time - you can break the simulation into multiple parts in an essential way and run these parts on data centers across the planet which communicate with each other. Further, you can freeze the simulation for a couple of days and reload. As long as there is no connection to outer signals like the system clock, the simulation wouldn't notice the gap. If you think the simulation doesn't have consciousness/qualia/X despite accurately replicating humans as measured by instruments, then the simulation is a p-zombie.