4 ms·

When we refer to heat we refer to the increase in entropy that has specific effects to things in our world. We can also describe a generic "disordered" state, w

When we refer to heat we refer to the increase in entropy that has specific effects to things in our world. We can also describe a generic "disordered" state, which doesn't imply a similar kind of causal compatibility. A simulation of entropy is equally disordered with no caveats despite not being exactly entropy due to the causal compatibility issue. Why think consciousness is like entropy rather than like disorder? In other words, why think consciousness is a physical property of some specific kind of matter rather than an abstract property that can supervene on any sufficiently robust physical substrate?

s1artibartfast 2y ago
>why think consciousness is a physical property of some specific kind of matter rather than an abstract property that can supervene on any sufficiently robust physical substrate? Im open to the idea that consciousness could arise on different substrates, but hold that the substrate is relevant, and we dont have a working definition of "robustness". This is part of a bigger challenge in which I claim there is no such thing as a perfect simulation. Simulation requires representation, which requires requires remaining differences unrepresented. Otherwise you just have just created the same thing, not a simulation. You can simulate the interaction of physical object with other physical objects using electronic object interacting with other electronic objects, but the two are not the same. The electronic object still can not interact with a physical object.
- hackinthebochs 2y ago
  >Simulation requires representation, which requires requires remaining differences unrepresented Right. But presumably not all physical properties of brains are necessary for consciousness. For example, the fact that action potentials happen on the order of 1ms to 1 second probably isn't intrinsic to consciousness. That is, there is no in principle problem with having consciousness supervene on neural networks that have much longer cycles for the basic substrate of communication. It also probably doesn't matter that neurons communicate through opening and closing ion channels, are made of carbon atoms, are constructed by protein assemblies produced from DNA, etc. What we need is to represent every necessary feature and relationship involved in manifesting consciousness. As a first pass estimation, it seems very likely that only the information-bearing structures are necessary for consciousness. But the information-bearing structures are substrate independent. It follows that a perfect simulation of these information-bearing structures engaged in their typical dynamics would be conscious. >You can simulate the interaction [...] but the two are not the same. This idea that something needs to be "the same" is doing a lot of work in your argument. But most relationships involved in brains are incidental to consciousness. We need to get clear on what the necessary features of consciousness are. This is the only measure of sameness that matters, not superficial resemblance.

s1artibartfast 2y ago

>why think consciousness is a physical property of some specific kind of matter rather than an abstract property that can supervene on any sufficiently robust physical substrate? Im open to the idea that consciousness could arise on different substrates, but hold that the substrate is relevant, and we dont have a working definition of "robustness". This is part of a bigger challenge in which I claim there is no such thing as a perfect simulation. Simulation requires representation, which requires requires remaining differences unrepresented. Otherwise you just have just created the same thing, not a simulation. You can simulate the interaction of physical object with other physical objects using electronic object interacting with other electronic objects, but the two are not the same. The electronic object still can not interact with a physical object.

hackinthebochs 2y ago
>Simulation requires representation, which requires requires remaining differences unrepresented Right. But presumably not all physical properties of brains are necessary for consciousness. For example, the fact that action potentials happen on the order of 1ms to 1 second probably isn't intrinsic to consciousness. That is, there is no in principle problem with having consciousness supervene on neural networks that have much longer cycles for the basic substrate of communication. It also probably doesn't matter that neurons communicate through opening and closing ion channels, are made of carbon atoms, are constructed by protein assemblies produced from DNA, etc. What we need is to represent every necessary feature and relationship involved in manifesting consciousness. As a first pass estimation, it seems very likely that only the information-bearing structures are necessary for consciousness. But the information-bearing structures are substrate independent. It follows that a perfect simulation of these information-bearing structures engaged in their typical dynamics would be conscious. >You can simulate the interaction [...] but the two are not the same. This idea that something needs to be "the same" is doing a lot of work in your argument. But most relationships involved in brains are incidental to consciousness. We need to get clear on what the necessary features of consciousness are. This is the only measure of sameness that matters, not superficial resemblance.