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> Point 2 is textbook begging the question: it imagines a world which is physically identical to ours but consciousness is different there. It's not begging th

> Point 2 is textbook begging the question: it imagines a world which is physically identical to ours but consciousness is different there. It's not begging the question. He gives reasons for (2) that support the premise. That the premise essentially leads inexorably to (4) is a feature of the argument structure, not a bug. You have to engage with his reasons for (2) in determining whether or not the argument succeeds.

tasty_freeze 2y ago
Can you give an outline of some of that evidence? I haven't read source Chalmers, just other people's discussions of the topic (including the article that is the subject of this thread).
- hackinthebochs 2y ago
  The argument is roughly that (1) we can conceive of the physical dynamics of this world occurring without any associated consciousness, (2) if something is conceivable then it is logically possible, (3) It is logically possible that the physical dynamics of this world occur without any associated consciousness. (1) is supported by noticing that all our explanations of physical dynamics appeals to other physical dynamics. We do not need to mention consciousness or qualitative anything to derive any of the physical dynamics we observe in this world. Thus there is nothing logically incoherent about physical dynamics without consciousness. (2) follows from the fact that logical possibility just means no contradiction. If we cannot see any contradiction in two propositions being true, then that is defeasible evidence for the logical possibility of both propositions being true.
  - RaftPeople 2y ago
    > if something is conceivable then it is logically possible What does it mean to be "logically possible"? We could conceive of something that is pure garbage due to our lack of knowledge. Something that could never exist due to nature of the universe, but just because we can conceive of it does not mean it's a valid and non-contradictory state for the universe. It's possible it's a valid argument from the perspective that it forces us into the corner of stating one of these two conditions must be true: either p-zombies or consciousness requires attributes to our reality that are beyond our current physical understanding.
    - hackinthebochs 2y ago
      Logically possible just means there's no contradiction in accepting something as true. Usually it's used in the context of reasoning about what could have been true about the world. If some features of the world are varied, what else has to change to maintain consistency? And sure, plenty of people argue that conceivability is a weak guide to possibility due to our limited knowledge, being imperfect reasoners, etc. That's a fair critique. >either p-zombies or consciousness requires attributes to our reality that are beyond our current physical understanding. To be clear, the impossibility of p-zombies implies that there is some as yet unidentified logical/semantic relationship between physical dynamics and consciousness. This would mean that there is no possible world where the physical dynamics is true but there is no consciousness. The possibility of p-zombies supports the idea that there is some further (non-logical) property of the world that supports consciousness. But such a property could have been false in a world very much like our own; one with all the same physical dynamics just without any consciousness. The p-zombie argument is used to raise the credence of there being a further fact about the world that supports consciousness.
      - chr1 2y ago
        The problem with p-zombie argument is that it is completely inconsequential. It is like if i say there is some property let's call it phi-factor, i am certain i have it, some people have it too, and some do not, but there is absolutely no way for others to tell who has this phi-factor thing and who does not, because it doesn't cause any difference in behavior of people. This kind of hypothesis doesn't explain anything and does not predict anything, and therefore it is not possible to build any logical chain based on it. There are good versions of p-zombie argument, e.g. you could say that it is very hard to find difference in behavior of people and p-zombies, but if you create planet like simulation inhabited with p-zombies they will have large differences, e.g. they will never develop art, or science, or religion, or will die out because will not want to have children. In any case there needs to be some measurable difference in behavior, for argument to be valid. But since this is a normal testable theory, it does not lead to the same kind of self-contradictory statements as p-zombie version, and therefore is not popular with philosophers who want to talk about things they have nothing to say about.
  - tasty_freeze 2y ago
    Thanks for the response! But your syllogism seems to be different that the one presented in the linked article that attempted to summarize Chalmer's logic. I don't contest your point 1 at all -- I believe in most of there universe there is no consciousness, and for much of Earth's history there was no consciousness here either. For point 2 -- perhaps "logically possible" is a term of art that I'm not familiar with, so I am perhaps missing the point. But on a plain reading I can't support this point. Recycling a point I made earlier, I can conceive of a world where the center of the sun is made of chocolate, but it is not logically possible. Point 3 -- the conclusion you have arrived at isn't contested. Materialists are not claiming consciousness is the cause of the physical processes, rather it is the result of them. As I said in my response to point 1, much of earth's history didn't have any conscious experiencers. We could say: (1) we can conceive of the physical dynamics of this world occurring without waterfalls. (2) if something is conceivable then it is logically possible (3) It is logically possible that the physical dynamics of this world occur without any associated waterfalls. I don't see what insight this syllogism is presenting: one can imagine a world where the set of actually realized manifestations of physical laws is different, but it doesn't speak to whether the unmanifested things are not present because they are non-physical (at least in part).
    - hackinthebochs 2y ago
      >I can conceive of a world where the center of the sun is made of chocolate, but it is not logically possible. How do you know its logically impossible if you can conceive of it? If there's some fact you are aware of that makes it logically impossible, then that means its not conceivable, by the philosophically relevant meaning of the term.

tasty_freeze 2y ago

Can you give an outline of some of that evidence? I haven't read source Chalmers, just other people's discussions of the topic (including the article that is the subject of this thread).

hackinthebochs 2y ago
The argument is roughly that (1) we can conceive of the physical dynamics of this world occurring without any associated consciousness, (2) if something is conceivable then it is logically possible, (3) It is logically possible that the physical dynamics of this world occur without any associated consciousness. (1) is supported by noticing that all our explanations of physical dynamics appeals to other physical dynamics. We do not need to mention consciousness or qualitative anything to derive any of the physical dynamics we observe in this world. Thus there is nothing logically incoherent about physical dynamics without consciousness. (2) follows from the fact that logical possibility just means no contradiction. If we cannot see any contradiction in two propositions being true, then that is defeasible evidence for the logical possibility of both propositions being true.
- RaftPeople 2y ago
  > if something is conceivable then it is logically possible What does it mean to be "logically possible"? We could conceive of something that is pure garbage due to our lack of knowledge. Something that could never exist due to nature of the universe, but just because we can conceive of it does not mean it's a valid and non-contradictory state for the universe. It's possible it's a valid argument from the perspective that it forces us into the corner of stating one of these two conditions must be true: either p-zombies or consciousness requires attributes to our reality that are beyond our current physical understanding.
  - hackinthebochs 2y ago
    Logically possible just means there's no contradiction in accepting something as true. Usually it's used in the context of reasoning about what could have been true about the world. If some features of the world are varied, what else has to change to maintain consistency? And sure, plenty of people argue that conceivability is a weak guide to possibility due to our limited knowledge, being imperfect reasoners, etc. That's a fair critique. >either p-zombies or consciousness requires attributes to our reality that are beyond our current physical understanding. To be clear, the impossibility of p-zombies implies that there is some as yet unidentified logical/semantic relationship between physical dynamics and consciousness. This would mean that there is no possible world where the physical dynamics is true but there is no consciousness. The possibility of p-zombies supports the idea that there is some further (non-logical) property of the world that supports consciousness. But such a property could have been false in a world very much like our own; one with all the same physical dynamics just without any consciousness. The p-zombie argument is used to raise the credence of there being a further fact about the world that supports consciousness.
    - chr1 2y ago
      The problem with p-zombie argument is that it is completely inconsequential. It is like if i say there is some property let's call it phi-factor, i am certain i have it, some people have it too, and some do not, but there is absolutely no way for others to tell who has this phi-factor thing and who does not, because it doesn't cause any difference in behavior of people. This kind of hypothesis doesn't explain anything and does not predict anything, and therefore it is not possible to build any logical chain based on it. There are good versions of p-zombie argument, e.g. you could say that it is very hard to find difference in behavior of people and p-zombies, but if you create planet like simulation inhabited with p-zombies they will have large differences, e.g. they will never develop art, or science, or religion, or will die out because will not want to have children. In any case there needs to be some measurable difference in behavior, for argument to be valid. But since this is a normal testable theory, it does not lead to the same kind of self-contradictory statements as p-zombie version, and therefore is not popular with philosophers who want to talk about things they have nothing to say about.
- tasty_freeze 2y ago
  Thanks for the response! But your syllogism seems to be different that the one presented in the linked article that attempted to summarize Chalmer's logic. I don't contest your point 1 at all -- I believe in most of there universe there is no consciousness, and for much of Earth's history there was no consciousness here either. For point 2 -- perhaps "logically possible" is a term of art that I'm not familiar with, so I am perhaps missing the point. But on a plain reading I can't support this point. Recycling a point I made earlier, I can conceive of a world where the center of the sun is made of chocolate, but it is not logically possible. Point 3 -- the conclusion you have arrived at isn't contested. Materialists are not claiming consciousness is the cause of the physical processes, rather it is the result of them. As I said in my response to point 1, much of earth's history didn't have any conscious experiencers. We could say: (1) we can conceive of the physical dynamics of this world occurring without waterfalls. (2) if something is conceivable then it is logically possible (3) It is logically possible that the physical dynamics of this world occur without any associated waterfalls. I don't see what insight this syllogism is presenting: one can imagine a world where the set of actually realized manifestations of physical laws is different, but it doesn't speak to whether the unmanifested things are not present because they are non-physical (at least in part).
  - hackinthebochs 2y ago
    >I can conceive of a world where the center of the sun is made of chocolate, but it is not logically possible. How do you know its logically impossible if you can conceive of it? If there's some fact you are aware of that makes it logically impossible, then that means its not conceivable, by the philosophically relevant meaning of the term.