4 ms·
Is there a good authentication system that doesn't involve storing passwords, hashed passwords, or encrypted passwords in the master database?
by astrodust 14y ago
Is there a good authentication system that doesn't involve storing passwords, hashed passwords, or encrypted passwords in the master database?
- tantalor 14y agohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federated_identity http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federated_identity
- chc 14y agoFederated identity doesn't replace passwords, it just punts the whole process of authentication to a third party. That third party will still need to authenticate the user somehow, which brings us right back where we started.
- dbecker 14y agoBut it allows the passwords to be stored by someone who specializes in security. It'd be nice if everyone who runs a non-trivial website stayed was a security expert, but we're also busy with other aspects of the site.
- pcwalton 14y agoThere's Secure Remote Password, which stores a non-reversible verifier instead: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Remote_Password_protocol http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Remote_Password_protocol Apparently it's quite tricky to implement properly though.
- astrodust 14y agoIt's also quite tricky to explain to your investors and your customers that your password database was stolen. Maybe some day there will be "Security as a Service" where someone helps you do this properly.
- timtadh 14y agoI believe @tptacek will gladly accept your money for this service. As will Cigital.
- drivebyacct2 14y ago"Security as a Service" that does what? Teaches you how to store data securely, explain to investors that user data was stolen or an outsourced password verification utility. The first can be done if people would bother to learn and completely understand what they're doing (this thread and the corrections I've had to make seems to prove that people think they know what they're doing when they don't). The second, have fun with. The third is already solved. oAuth, OpenID, Facebook Connect, Twitter, BrowserID, etc.
- uvdiv 14y agoCryptographic hashes are "non-reversible" too. But they're both vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks if the attacker obtains the host's secrets -- which I think is what `astroduck' was really asking about, leaked server databases like this news story. (I don't see how there's any possible protocol that behaves otherwise: if Alice is capable of proving she possesses a secret to Bob through a protocol, then Bob can always discover Alice's secret by playing that protocol with himself, enumerating every possible secret until the protocol succeeds. And so can anyone who knows everything that Bob knows about Alice's secret.) The SRP paper doesn't say much about this except that brute-force dictionary attacks are "expensive". I don't think they make specific claims about computational hardness like scrypt. The paper was written in 1997. "An attacker who captures the host's password file cannot directly compromise user-to-host authentication and gain access to the host without an expensive dictionary search." http://srp.stanford.edu/ndss.html http://srp.stanford.edu/ndss.html
- nnnnnnnn 14y agoYes. A great, practical and scalable example is found in ssh: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell#Key_management http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell#Key_management I'll try to explain how it works in non-technical terms (so please don't nitpick as I'm glossing over details) User generates a public and private keypair. The public key is given to the remote site (such as LoL or Linkedin), but the public key is not secret -- it is public. You can post it on your blog, whatever. You can use it for multiple accounts without concern. The public key allows one to encrypt some data, but the public key cannot decrypt the data. The private key can decrypt the data. When the user wishes to log in the remote site, using the public key, encrypts a random string and sends it to the user. If the user manages to successfully decrypt this random string and send it back then the remote site can infer that the user holds the private key -- because only the private key can perform the decryption. The private key is never sent to a remote party. Only meaningless random strings are communicated over the wire. The (significant) drawback to this method is that the user will have to have the private key with them in order to perform the authentication. But perhaps mobile devices will solve that problem for us.
- astrodust 14y agoI would love to see an ssh-like key exchange built into browsers. You add your key to the site, GitHub style, and then you use that for auth. No more nonsense with OAuth or "remember my password" or the remote site having your password just because they grabbed the DB. It's just a useless public key to them.
- Zash 14y agoSSL Client certificate authentication has existed in browsers for a long time. Browsers even have built in key generation, but noone uses it. Probably because the UI is not very good. Mozillas new BrowserID scheme is pretty similar to this too.
- nnnnnnnn 14y agoPKI as implemented by SSL Certs is needlessly complicated, which is a big part of why no one has adopted it for end user authentication. Compare what I described above to the mess described here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_infrastructure http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_infrastructure A decentralized key system as ssh provides is much more appropriate for end users.
- pbreit 14y agoNo. Simple passwords properly stored and monitored provide the best balance between user experience and security.
- TimJRobinson 14y agoAll these sites have to do is store the passwords using bcrypt and with salts and they're pretty much uncrackable (as far as we know). The reason they're uncrackable is because when using bcrypt it takes a second or more to generate a hash for a password (compared to 0.000001 seconds for md5) meaning if they want to try and brute force the password or build a rainbow table it'll take them years instead of seconds to crack each password. There's no need to remote password storage, they just need to learn more about password security.