3 ms·

exactly, The parent post does not address the issue of representation vs reality. You can simulate every molecular interaction in a fire, but that does not mea

exactly, The parent post does not address the issue of representation vs reality. You can simulate every molecular interaction in a fire, but that does not mean the simulation gives off the same heat. You can write a perfectly accurate equation for splitting an atom, but the equation does not release energy.

codeflo 2y ago
> You can simulate every molecular interaction in a fire, but that does not mean the simulation gives off the same heat It would to a simulated being standing next to the fire. > You can write a perfectly accurate equation for splitting an atom, but the equation does not release energy. It releases simulated energy inside the simulation. Every material interaction is simulated. If you believe that consciousness can't exist in the simulation, then you believe that consciousness is not a material interaction, q.e.d.
- vundercind 2y ago
  It’s some electrons moving around. Any further meaning of that is only what we assign to it. Unless your “computer” is identical matter in the same arrangement and state is the original, actually doing stuff. This is why the “what if you slowly simulated the entire universe on an infinite beach moving rocks around to represent the state? Could anything in it be conscious?” thing isn’t my very interesting. No, you’re just shoving rocks around on sand. They don’t mean anything except what you decide they do. Easy answer.
  - MrScruff 2y ago
    Doesn't materialism imply that a perfectly accurate simulation of the universe would be identical to the universe we live in? If not, in what possible way could the two be distinguished?
- s1artibartfast 2y ago
  >Every material interaction is simulated. If you believe that consciousness can't exist in the simulation, then you believe that consciousness is not a material interaction I think that is missing the point. You are literally changing the material and medium by conducting a simulation. Releasing simulated energy within a simulation is not identical to releasing real energy in the real world. The former is purely representational, and even a perfectly simulated object retains this property, and lack of equivalence. a simulated atom is not a real atom, no mater their similarlity.
hackinthebochs 2y ago
When we refer to heat we refer to the increase in entropy that has specific effects to things in our world. We can also describe a generic "disordered" state, which doesn't imply a similar kind of causal compatibility. A simulation of entropy is equally disordered with no caveats despite not being exactly entropy due to the causal compatibility issue. Why think consciousness is like entropy rather than like disorder? In other words, why think consciousness is a physical property of some specific kind of matter rather than an abstract property that can supervene on any sufficiently robust physical substrate?
- s1artibartfast 2y ago
  >why think consciousness is a physical property of some specific kind of matter rather than an abstract property that can supervene on any sufficiently robust physical substrate? Im open to the idea that consciousness could arise on different substrates, but hold that the substrate is relevant, and we dont have a working definition of "robustness". This is part of a bigger challenge in which I claim there is no such thing as a perfect simulation. Simulation requires representation, which requires requires remaining differences unrepresented. Otherwise you just have just created the same thing, not a simulation. You can simulate the interaction of physical object with other physical objects using electronic object interacting with other electronic objects, but the two are not the same. The electronic object still can not interact with a physical object.
  - hackinthebochs 2y ago
    >Simulation requires representation, which requires requires remaining differences unrepresented Right. But presumably not all physical properties of brains are necessary for consciousness. For example, the fact that action potentials happen on the order of 1ms to 1 second probably isn't intrinsic to consciousness. That is, there is no in principle problem with having consciousness supervene on neural networks that have much longer cycles for the basic substrate of communication. It also probably doesn't matter that neurons communicate through opening and closing ion channels, are made of carbon atoms, are constructed by protein assemblies produced from DNA, etc. What we need is to represent every necessary feature and relationship involved in manifesting consciousness. As a first pass estimation, it seems very likely that only the information-bearing structures are necessary for consciousness. But the information-bearing structures are substrate independent. It follows that a perfect simulation of these information-bearing structures engaged in their typical dynamics would be conscious. >You can simulate the interaction [...] but the two are not the same. This idea that something needs to be "the same" is doing a lot of work in your argument. But most relationships involved in brains are incidental to consciousness. We need to get clear on what the necessary features of consciousness are. This is the only measure of sameness that matters, not superficial resemblance.

codeflo 2y ago

> You can simulate every molecular interaction in a fire, but that does not mean the simulation gives off the same heat It would to a simulated being standing next to the fire. > You can write a perfectly accurate equation for splitting an atom, but the equation does not release energy. It releases simulated energy inside the simulation. Every material interaction is simulated. If you believe that consciousness can't exist in the simulation, then you believe that consciousness is not a material interaction, q.e.d.

vundercind 2y ago
It’s some electrons moving around. Any further meaning of that is only what we assign to it. Unless your “computer” is identical matter in the same arrangement and state is the original, actually doing stuff. This is why the “what if you slowly simulated the entire universe on an infinite beach moving rocks around to represent the state? Could anything in it be conscious?” thing isn’t my very interesting. No, you’re just shoving rocks around on sand. They don’t mean anything except what you decide they do. Easy answer.
- MrScruff 2y ago
  Doesn't materialism imply that a perfectly accurate simulation of the universe would be identical to the universe we live in? If not, in what possible way could the two be distinguished?
s1artibartfast 2y ago
>Every material interaction is simulated. If you believe that consciousness can't exist in the simulation, then you believe that consciousness is not a material interaction I think that is missing the point. You are literally changing the material and medium by conducting a simulation. Releasing simulated energy within a simulation is not identical to releasing real energy in the real world. The former is purely representational, and even a perfectly simulated object retains this property, and lack of equivalence. a simulated atom is not a real atom, no mater their similarlity.

hackinthebochs 2y ago

When we refer to heat we refer to the increase in entropy that has specific effects to things in our world. We can also describe a generic "disordered" state, which doesn't imply a similar kind of causal compatibility. A simulation of entropy is equally disordered with no caveats despite not being exactly entropy due to the causal compatibility issue. Why think consciousness is like entropy rather than like disorder? In other words, why think consciousness is a physical property of some specific kind of matter rather than an abstract property that can supervene on any sufficiently robust physical substrate?

s1artibartfast 2y ago
>why think consciousness is a physical property of some specific kind of matter rather than an abstract property that can supervene on any sufficiently robust physical substrate? Im open to the idea that consciousness could arise on different substrates, but hold that the substrate is relevant, and we dont have a working definition of "robustness". This is part of a bigger challenge in which I claim there is no such thing as a perfect simulation. Simulation requires representation, which requires requires remaining differences unrepresented. Otherwise you just have just created the same thing, not a simulation. You can simulate the interaction of physical object with other physical objects using electronic object interacting with other electronic objects, but the two are not the same. The electronic object still can not interact with a physical object.
- hackinthebochs 2y ago
  >Simulation requires representation, which requires requires remaining differences unrepresented Right. But presumably not all physical properties of brains are necessary for consciousness. For example, the fact that action potentials happen on the order of 1ms to 1 second probably isn't intrinsic to consciousness. That is, there is no in principle problem with having consciousness supervene on neural networks that have much longer cycles for the basic substrate of communication. It also probably doesn't matter that neurons communicate through opening and closing ion channels, are made of carbon atoms, are constructed by protein assemblies produced from DNA, etc. What we need is to represent every necessary feature and relationship involved in manifesting consciousness. As a first pass estimation, it seems very likely that only the information-bearing structures are necessary for consciousness. But the information-bearing structures are substrate independent. It follows that a perfect simulation of these information-bearing structures engaged in their typical dynamics would be conscious. >You can simulate the interaction [...] but the two are not the same. This idea that something needs to be "the same" is doing a lot of work in your argument. But most relationships involved in brains are incidental to consciousness. We need to get clear on what the necessary features of consciousness are. This is the only measure of sameness that matters, not superficial resemblance.