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Why would you assume that? Because in the vast majority of cases, when someone posts some version of "The US/West could have prevented this war if they wanted

Why would you assume that? Because in the vast majority of cases, when someone posts some version of "The US/West could have prevented this war if they wanted to" (or "It could have ended with the March 2022 negotiations") that's exactly what they mean (territorial concessions), either tacitly or explicitly. But of course I'll take your word that this wasn't the sense you were intending. As to what you're now saying: For one that doesn't like a diplomatic solution, but an overtly military one. More importantly, the Budapest Memorandum doesn't establish that the US has any "commitments" to come to the aid of any of the 3 countries (BY, UA, KZ) should they come under attack (and Russia would never have signed it if it did). It merely asks that the signatory powers respect the newly established sovereign status of these countries; to refrain from using force or economic coercion against them; and to not nuke them, please. And that the signing powers will consult each other in situations that pertain to these commitments. That's why the language was specifically chosen to read "Security Assurances" and not "Guarantees". The latter implies a commitment to some kind of a military response, like NATO's Article 5. But the former does not. You can still maintain the position that the US/UK should have done something different in 2014 or 2022 -- but the simple fact is, there was no commitment expressed in the Budapest Memorandum which required them to do so. And this is probably the main reason they ultimately did not. This, and a perfectly reasonable desire not to stumble into a direct and intrinsically risky confrontation with their main nuclear rival. Or a protracted / large-scale conflict of any kind with no clear signal of public support.

jemmyw 2y ago
I know that the wording of the Budapest Memorandum didn't require a commitment but it could have been a basis for "you signed this and by breaking this agreement we have grounds for a defense". A defense pact could also have been made with Ukraine without them being made a NATO member. > This, and a perfectly reasonable desire not to stumble into a direct and intrinsically risky confrontation with their main nuclear rival But now the situation is worse, a hot proxy war. By making an agreement with Kiev before the war it would have been Russia who needed to avoid a confrontation. > For one that doesn't like a diplomatic solution, but an overtly military one. It might be closer to gunboat diplomacy, but rather that than the senseless loss of life we've had since then.
- racional 2y ago
  But now the situation is worse, a hot proxy war. The thing is -- the response you're retroactively advocating here (aggressive brinkmanship) would have been by definition a major gamble. And it does seem that you're basically assuming that the "dice" would have turned up your way. Whereas most likely the US/UK mindset was: "Yeah, it could go our way, if we went that route. Or it could trigger a nuclear escalation, either as an intentional response from their side -- or a purely accidental one. The odds for this are quite high -- at a bare minimum 10 percent, according to our analysts, though some say the risk is far higher." The current situation has a recurring risk of escalation also, of course -- though objectively a far lower one. I don't think they were thinking about a long-term proxy war at the time (as they generally thought Ukraine would be simply overrun if not defended). But we can be very sure they were thinking about the categorically more important issue of avoiding response that could trigger a nuclear escalation -- especially in very short term.

jemmyw 2y ago

I know that the wording of the Budapest Memorandum didn't require a commitment but it could have been a basis for "you signed this and by breaking this agreement we have grounds for a defense". A defense pact could also have been made with Ukraine without them being made a NATO member. > This, and a perfectly reasonable desire not to stumble into a direct and intrinsically risky confrontation with their main nuclear rival But now the situation is worse, a hot proxy war. By making an agreement with Kiev before the war it would have been Russia who needed to avoid a confrontation. > For one that doesn't like a diplomatic solution, but an overtly military one. It might be closer to gunboat diplomacy, but rather that than the senseless loss of life we've had since then.

racional 2y ago
But now the situation is worse, a hot proxy war. The thing is -- the response you're retroactively advocating here (aggressive brinkmanship) would have been by definition a major gamble. And it does seem that you're basically assuming that the "dice" would have turned up your way. Whereas most likely the US/UK mindset was: "Yeah, it could go our way, if we went that route. Or it could trigger a nuclear escalation, either as an intentional response from their side -- or a purely accidental one. The odds for this are quite high -- at a bare minimum 10 percent, according to our analysts, though some say the risk is far higher." The current situation has a recurring risk of escalation also, of course -- though objectively a far lower one. I don't think they were thinking about a long-term proxy war at the time (as they generally thought Ukraine would be simply overrun if not defended). But we can be very sure they were thinking about the categorically more important issue of avoiding response that could trigger a nuclear escalation -- especially in very short term.