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>I suppose it’s reasonable but the question will now turn to what is actually an official duty. I'm fairly sure there's a full and complete list of these is ex

>I suppose it’s reasonable but the question will now turn to what is actually an official duty. I'm fairly sure there's a full and complete list of these is explicitly in the Constitution.

throw0101b 2y ago
> I'm fairly sure there's a full and complete list of these is explicitly in the Constitution. Roberts disagrees in the decision (p. 17): > Distinguishing the President’s official actions from his unofficial ones can be difficult. When the President acts pursuant to “constitutional and statutory authority,” he takes official action to perform the functions of his office. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 757. Determining whether an ac- tion is covered by immunity thus begins with assessing the President’s authority to take that action. > But the breadth of the President’s “discretionary respon- sibilities” under the Constitution and laws of the United States “in a broad variety of areas, many of them highly sensitive,” frequently makes it “difficult to determine which of [his] innumerable ‘functions’ encompassed a particular action.” Id., at 756. And some Presidential conduct—for example, speaking to and on behalf of the American people, see Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 701 (2018)—certainly can qualify as official even when not obviously connected to a particular constitutional or statutory provision. For those reasons, the immunity we have recognized extends to the “outer perimeter” of the President’s official responsibilities, covering actions so long as they are “not manifestly or pal- pably beyond [his] authority.” Blassingame v. Trump, 87F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC 2023) (internal quotation marks omit- ted); see Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 755–756 (noting that we have “refused to draw functional lines finer than history and reason would support”). > In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives. Such an inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of of- ficial conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose, thereby intruding on the Article II in- terests that immunity seeks to protect. Indeed, “[i]t would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government” if “[i]n exercising the functions of his office,” the President was “under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry.” […] > Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law. For in- stance, when Fitzgerald contended that his dismissal vio- lated various congressional statutes and thus rendered his discharge “outside the outer perimeter of [Nixon’s] duties,” we rejected that contention. 457 U. S., at 756. Otherwise, Presidents would be subject to trial on “every allegation that an action was unlawful,” depriving immunity of its intended effect. Ibid. * https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
- lenerdenator 2y ago
  That last point is bothersome, because if you're looking at "color of law" as a defense, when does that end? A good example is that killer cop in Minneapolis, I don't remember his name or care to fill my brain with it. He was acting officially when George Floyd died under his care; he was responding to a 911 call that Floyd was the subject of. The cop was convicted of murder, but let's say that POTUS does something abhorrent (and this is likely to occur now that this is case law) under color of law and someone wanted to charge him or her because of it. Does that get somehow pulled back as it did for the cop?
  - klyrs 2y ago
    Trump's legal team argued, I think in this case, that a president should be immune from prosecution up to and including calling a hit on a political opponent. Which, given all the consternation about Biden persecuting his political opponent, sounded like a bit of an invitation...
    - lenerdenator 2y ago
      Well, SCOTUS didn't give POTUS license to do that, but they did give license to do something awful and then have their defense team argue that the act was a part of official duties, with a chance that a judge, possibly appointed by the President, agrees. The thing about Biden, since you brought him up, is he's unlikely to test this in any meaningful way with regards to Trump. Could he theoretically now have the USSS detail in charge of babysitting Trump indefinitely detain him, without consequence? Maybe. But he still has at least some belief in the process and won't do that. This gives me flashbacks to lessons about von Hindenburg. An old guard who had belief in the process going by it even when dealing with someone who has obvious and sneering contempt for that process.
      - ffgjgf1 2y ago
        > An old guard who had belief in the process going by it even when dealing with To be fair the situation in Germany was multipolar. Hindenburg wasn’t a huge fan of democracy or especially of one run by Catholics, liberals and socialists and just saw the nazis as a lesser evil..
readthenotes1 2y ago
[flagged]

>I suppose it’s reasonable but the question will now turn to what is actually an official duty. I'm fairly sure there's a full and complete list of these is explicitly in the Constitution.

throw0101b 2y ago

> I'm fairly sure there's a full and complete list of these is explicitly in the Constitution. Roberts disagrees in the decision (p. 17): > Distinguishing the President’s official actions from his unofficial ones can be difficult. When the President acts pursuant to “constitutional and statutory authority,” he takes official action to perform the functions of his office. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 757. Determining whether an ac- tion is covered by immunity thus begins with assessing the President’s authority to take that action. > But the breadth of the President’s “discretionary respon- sibilities” under the Constitution and laws of the United States “in a broad variety of areas, many of them highly sensitive,” frequently makes it “difficult to determine which of [his] innumerable ‘functions’ encompassed a particular action.” Id., at 756. And some Presidential conduct—for example, speaking to and on behalf of the American people, see Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 701 (2018)—certainly can qualify as official even when not obviously connected to a particular constitutional or statutory provision. For those reasons, the immunity we have recognized extends to the “outer perimeter” of the President’s official responsibilities, covering actions so long as they are “not manifestly or pal- pably beyond [his] authority.” Blassingame v. Trump, 87F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC 2023) (internal quotation marks omit- ted); see Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 755–756 (noting that we have “refused to draw functional lines finer than history and reason would support”). > In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives. Such an inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of of- ficial conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose, thereby intruding on the Article II in- terests that immunity seeks to protect. Indeed, “[i]t would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government” if “[i]n exercising the functions of his office,” the President was “under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry.” […] > Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law. For in- stance, when Fitzgerald contended that his dismissal vio- lated various congressional statutes and thus rendered his discharge “outside the outer perimeter of [Nixon’s] duties,” we rejected that contention. 457 U. S., at 756. Otherwise, Presidents would be subject to trial on “every allegation that an action was unlawful,” depriving immunity of its intended effect. Ibid. * https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf

lenerdenator 2y ago
That last point is bothersome, because if you're looking at "color of law" as a defense, when does that end? A good example is that killer cop in Minneapolis, I don't remember his name or care to fill my brain with it. He was acting officially when George Floyd died under his care; he was responding to a 911 call that Floyd was the subject of. The cop was convicted of murder, but let's say that POTUS does something abhorrent (and this is likely to occur now that this is case law) under color of law and someone wanted to charge him or her because of it. Does that get somehow pulled back as it did for the cop?
- klyrs 2y ago
  Trump's legal team argued, I think in this case, that a president should be immune from prosecution up to and including calling a hit on a political opponent. Which, given all the consternation about Biden persecuting his political opponent, sounded like a bit of an invitation...
  - lenerdenator 2y ago
    Well, SCOTUS didn't give POTUS license to do that, but they did give license to do something awful and then have their defense team argue that the act was a part of official duties, with a chance that a judge, possibly appointed by the President, agrees. The thing about Biden, since you brought him up, is he's unlikely to test this in any meaningful way with regards to Trump. Could he theoretically now have the USSS detail in charge of babysitting Trump indefinitely detain him, without consequence? Maybe. But he still has at least some belief in the process and won't do that. This gives me flashbacks to lessons about von Hindenburg. An old guard who had belief in the process going by it even when dealing with someone who has obvious and sneering contempt for that process.
    - ffgjgf1 2y ago
      > An old guard who had belief in the process going by it even when dealing with To be fair the situation in Germany was multipolar. Hindenburg wasn’t a huge fan of democracy or especially of one run by Catholics, liberals and socialists and just saw the nazis as a lesser evil..

readthenotes1 2y ago

[flagged]