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This turned into a rant - possibly a rant with no informed opinions. Apologies in advance. I think we can look at our vulnerabilities in three levels - open
by lifeisstillgood 14y ago
This turned into a rant - possibly a rant with no informed opinions. Apologies in advance.
I think we can look at our vulnerabilities in three levels
- open windows
Backdoors left in as factory defaults, connecting 20 year old systems to Internet by slapping on an NIC. These are the blue collar computer systems running trains and factories. Replacing their systems with (OpenBSD) must be a major national priority. It will cost a fortune, and the foolish thing is to imagine we should replace like for like functionality.
As someone above noted, the md5 encryption was used to maintain backwards capability with a system uneconomic to upgrade. As a society we either make that an unacceptable deal or we turn off the lights now
This will disrupt a lot of industries. In both senses of the word.
- best practises - The cloud and competitive contracting will take care of things like not upgrading your OS for ten years. Thats doing what you already do but better. The killer practises will be the ones we don't do at all. Almost no-one sends me PGP signed or encrypted email. And even if they did I have no web of trust that links them back to me. Let's see Facebook or LinkedIns social graph become a layered web of trust. Then tripwire can tell me that the server I am giving my credit card has binaries that were signed by a sysadmin who is linked to three guys I know and the binary hashed match those signed by shuttle worth. In real time. And I am just making that up. But it is feasible.
Defense in Transparency - why can't I know what binaries a server is running, who put them there and when? I can look at the locks on doors, see the quality of the mortar in the brickwork. Why can't I ask a system to tell me how secure it is and expect to get a audit able answer.
I think I am ranting. But I know we cannot trust industry certification or peer pressure. We need to get to a point where when there is no lock on a door it is clear for everyone to see, and everyone expects to see locked doors.
- pnathan 14y agoSecuring industrial systems is a major problem. Security - when not done perfect - is a disruption into efficiency, usability, and functionality. If you calculate the expected cost of a hack vs. the expected value of rebuilding the electronic infrastructure, in some situations being hacked is cheaper. Further, being hacked is rolling the dice... there is a probability it won't happen. Whereas, an electronic infrastructure rebuild is a guaranteed expense... and expensive. Then there's the Columbine mentality, "It could never happen here". That's pretty pervasive.
- lifeisstillgood 14y agoThese days being hacked is just a matter of time for say a winxp sp1/2. The environment is becoming flooded with oxygen and we need to evovle cellular Walls. The problem with cost benefit analysis is that it makes one core assumption. That tomorrow will be substantively like today. I don't believe in black swans but I do believe in climate change