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" … at that time, Google accepted hashes in two formats only... MD5 or SHA1." That's, ummm, _concerning_… I don't suppose anyone knows how securely Google are
by bigiain 14y ago
" … at that time, Google accepted hashes in two formats only... MD5 or SHA1."
That's, ummm, _concerning_…
I don't suppose anyone knows how securely Google are storing my gmail password? I _hope_ it's not unsalted MD5 or SHA1. (Especially since google search is probably the best general purpose md5 hash reverser most people have access to.)
- jsprinkles 14y agoGoogle could store passwords in plain text if they want, because they're never going to leak. I'm only partially joking.
- ominous_prime 14y agoLast migration I did (maybe 12 months ago), google only accepted passwords as an sha1 hash IIRC. I was told however, that was only an intermediary step, and google runs that hash through another KDF for internal use. The sha1sum of the password is really only used for transport to their API, as an alternative to sending it in plain-text which is what your browser does when you login to google services, so I don't see it as a huge problem. Sure it could be more secure, but interoperability and keeping a relatively low barrier of entry are very important to them too.
- moioci 14y agoI thought Google logon defaulted to SSL for all services.
- brian_cloutier 14y agoIt's still sent in plain text. Your browser doesn't do any hashing before sending your password to Google. But you're right, as far as anybody but you and Google are concerned, it's encrypted.
- ordinary 14y agoThere's no point in hashing the password before you send it, is there? A MITM could just as easily grab the hash and send it to Google instead.
- sirclueless 14y agoFor MITM attacks, sure. But it's a fairly portable, inexpensive way to make it more difficult to use your password with other protocols. For example, intercepting a plaintext Google password has a decent chance of making someone's bank account vulnerable.
- FaceKicker 14y agoBut in that case the password has only been compromised on that one website, as opposed to every other website where it's being used (likely a non-zero number of them given the average user's password habits). I'm no security expert but I think client-side password hashing with the domain name as the salt seems like a pretty good idea, especially for sites without HTTPS logins (but it also helps in the case of a database leak even for sites with HTTPS logins). Of course, for non-HTTPS logins a network attacker could modify the HTML form code to remove the client-side hashing without the user's knowledge, but it's still at least as secure as the alternative, modulo 'false sense of security' type arguments. Edit: never mind the last parenthetical; it pretty much wouldn't help in a database leak at all (just adds one extra hashing step to the cracking process), sorry. Still helps for non-HTTPS logins though. Edit 2: ... though maybe if the client-side hash were something strong like bcrypt, it would help in the case of database leaks on HTTPS sites that refuse to use strong hashing on the server side for performance reasons. Sorry for the rambly disorganized post.
- deleted 14y ago