> It's a category error to attribute intentions to algorithms because if an algorithm has intentions then so must numbers and arithmetic operations of numbers.

> It's a category error to attribute intentions to algorithms because if an algorithm has intentions then so must numbers and arithmetic operations of numbers. I don't see how that makes it a category error? Like, assuming that numbers and arithmetic operations of numbers don't have intentions, and assuming that algorithms having intentions would imply that numbers and arithmetic operations have them, afaict, we would only get the conclusion "algorithms do not have intentions", not "attributing intentions to algorithms is a category error". Suppose we replace "numbers" with "atoms" and "computers" with "chemicals" in what you said. This yields "As compositions of [atoms] there must be some [element (in the sense of part, not necessarily in the sense of an element of the periodic table)] in the composite with intentionality or the claim is that it is an emergent property in which case it becomes another unfounded belief in some magical quality of [chemicals] and I don't think [chemicals] have any magical qualities other than [...]." . What about this substitution changes the validity of the argument? Is it because you do think that atoms or chemicals have "magical qualities" ? I don't think this is what you mean, or at least, you probably wouldn't call the properties in question "magical". (Though maybe you also disagree that people are comprised of atoms (That's not a jab. I would probably agree with that.)) So, let's try the original statement, but without "magical". "As compositions of elementary operations there must be some element in the composite with intentionality or the claim is that it is an emergent property in which case it becomes another unfounded belief in some [suitable-for-emergent-intentionality] quality of computers and I don't think computers have any [suitable-for-emergent-intentionality] qualities [(though they do have properties for allowing computations)]." If you believe that humans are comprised of atoms, and that atoms lack intentionality, and that humans have intentionality, presumably you believe that atoms have [suitable-for-emergent-intentionality] qualities. One thing I think is relevant here, is "we have nothing showing us that there exist [x]" and "it cannot be that there exists [x]" . Even if we have nothing to demonstrate to us that numbers-and-operations-on-them have the suitable-for-emergent-intentionality qualities, that doesn't demonstrate that they don't. That doesn't mean we should believe that they do. If you have strong priors that they don't, that seems fine. But I don't think you've really given much of a reason that others should be convinced that they don't?