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> ... static adversary A that can corrupt ... Doesn't that mean that an adversary using multiple identities would be able to do so? And therefore, some means o

> ... static adversary A that can corrupt ... Doesn't that mean that an adversary using multiple identities would be able to do so? And therefore, some means of limiting the number of identities (through public key or prior trust) would still be desirable? What am I missing? Is this mitigated through staking?

mike_hearn 2y ago
You're not missing anything. Systems like this assume there is a pre-created set of honest and independent nodes, which might later get hacked. They don't apply in the more realistic setting the PoW blockchain algorithm solves, where nodes can enter and leave the consensus at will and may be malicious or non-independent from the start.
- chc4 2y ago
  You just do rounds of fixed sets of parties, like Ethereum proof of stake does. The set of nodes in each round are then needed to be 2/3rds honest. They then have Sybil resistance in each round as identities aren't free, since you need a stake in order to be selected for a round.
  - HeatrayEnjoyer 2y ago
    >Is it not still a simple matter of cost? An attacker who can 51% Blockchain has enough money to overcome resource scarcity walls of any construction.