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Is there a name for this property (i.e. a signature scheme only allowing an observer to realize that messages m1 and m2 are signed by the same public key if the
by lxgr 2y ago
Is there a name for this property (i.e. a signature scheme only allowing an observer to realize that messages m1 and m2 are signed by the same public key if they know that public key)?
I suppose it's an easy enough property to add to any signature protocol via a designated verifier scheme, and just defining the public key to be a combination of the public signature key and the secret verifier key.
I also wonder whether there is any formal proof (or at least an intuitive argument for why it would be intractable) for the variant of Schnorr signatures mentioned in the article.
- James_K 2y ago> if they know that public key This part makes it a pointless property. The public key is public. Everyone knows it so everyone can always determine which messages are signed by it.
- lxgr 2y agoThat’s definitely not always desirable. Very often I only want the signer to know what (or whether) I wrote, and on top of that I don’t always want them to be able to prove it to a third party. Non-repudiation is often a bug, not a feature! I believe the concept might be called designated verifier signatures, but I’m not too familiar with it, so I was hoping somebody could shed some light.
- magicalhippo 2y agoCould you clarify the scenario you have in mind? The whole point of signing messages is non-repudiation, so the recipient can be sure who sent it, no? So if you want repudiation then just don't sign the messages?
- lxgr 2y agoNon-repudiation doesn't (just) mean that the recipient can be sure who sent it; it means that they are able to prove to a third party who did. Sometimes, that's desired (e.g. for legal contracts); often it's not (e.g. when instant messaging with friends).
- magicalhippo 2y agoBarring quantum entanglement, how is proving to yourself different from proving to a third party? Of course, if you trust I won't share my private key, you could just encrypt your signature with my public key. That way my neighbor which wifi I'm using won't be able to tell you're sending me messages. But that hinges on me not sharing my private key with them. I don't see how any non-quantum scheme could prevent something similar.
- lxgr 2y agoAlice wants to profess her love to Bob, but isn't certain if the feelings are mutual. If they aren't, Alice is concerned that Bob might show her letter to Carol, Chuck and Chad, effectively publicly ridiculing her. (Carol, Chuck and Chad have a mean side to them, but they're not unreasonable: They'll only laugh if Bob can prove to them that he didn't just forge the love letter himself.) A bad way of doing this would be for Alice to sign her entire letter using her private RSA key, known to everybody (Bob, Carol, Chuck and Chad): The condition of Bob being able to verify its authenticity is fulfilled, but Alice is not safe from ridicule. So what Alice can do instead is, for example, to create a random symmetric key, and sign only that. She then encrypts and authenticates (which is different from signing!) her actual message using that key, using both symmetric encryption and a message authentication code. Finally, she encrypts the symmetric key and her signature of it to Bob. Now Bob can still be certain that he did indeed receive the message from Alice and nobody tampered with it, but he won't be able to prove that fact to anybody else, since he holds all the information required to forge any possible message. In fact, the only thing he can prove to the world is that, at some point, Alice wrote some message to somebody, but neither that that somebody was him, nor what that message might have contained.
- magicalhippo 2y agoYea ok I get your scenario now. > In fact, the only thing he can prove to the world is that, at some point, Alice wrote some message to somebody, but neither that that somebody was him, nor what that message might have contained. If he can decrypt it he can show the message to the world. And he can then use the approach from the article to show the world Alice signed the MAC key, hence she has communicated with him. But yeah, I forgot to consider MACs (I blame bedtime). I agree Bob can't prove which message Alice sent if that key is reused, or reuse can't be reliably rejected by third parties.