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Some systems require things being signed, but don't care for who signed it. E.g. the open source pro bono Maven/Java library repository. I think it serves the

Some systems require things being signed, but don't care for who signed it. E.g. the open source pro bono Maven/Java library repository. I think it serves the purpose of ensuring integrity with no requirement for revamping revealing the identity.

lxgr 2y ago
Not sure about that exact scenario, but a digital signature scheme without a set of trusted keys/signers seems pretty useless: If it's about e.g. detecting tampering of large files, a hash function achieves the same result much more efficiently. One thing it can be used for is continuity of authorship, though, I suppose: “v2 is by the same pseudonymous person that published v1”.
- withinboredom 2y ago
  I believe that was the point they were making.
  - lxgr 2y ago
    That's not the same as "not caring for who signed something" though, if you think about it: "Whoever holds the same key that signed this package" is still an identity, if a pseudonymous one.
    - withinboredom 2y ago
      But if you don't care who signed it, then you won't even notice if it was/wasn't signed by the same key. That's what I got out of what they were saying. As in, 'this whole charade is pointless ... but it does solve this somewhat tangentially related problem ... kinda'. > "Whoever holds the same key that signed this package" This only matters if you care or know what the keys are. If your guards let anyone in with a blue pass, it doesn't matter what the name is on the pass or if it even matches the name of the person.
      - lxgr 2y ago
        If nobody cares at all who signed a message, you don't need a signature scheme. > 'this whole charade is pointless ... but it does solve this somewhat tangentially related problem ... kinda'. I'd assume it isn't – why else would they be doing it (other than for compatibility with some package distribution scheme that, for other use cases, enforces the existence of a signature, which is arguably just a special case of "you don't need a signature scheme").
ted_dunning 2y ago
I don't think that works. Attackers could generate a key and sign a hacked artifact. Yes, somebody signed that artifact you might say, but I would worry who signed it and how much I should trust them.

lxgr 2y ago

Not sure about that exact scenario, but a digital signature scheme without a set of trusted keys/signers seems pretty useless: If it's about e.g. detecting tampering of large files, a hash function achieves the same result much more efficiently. One thing it can be used for is continuity of authorship, though, I suppose: “v2 is by the same pseudonymous person that published v1”.

withinboredom 2y ago
I believe that was the point they were making.
- lxgr 2y ago
  That's not the same as "not caring for who signed something" though, if you think about it: "Whoever holds the same key that signed this package" is still an identity, if a pseudonymous one.
  - withinboredom 2y ago
    But if you don't care who signed it, then you won't even notice if it was/wasn't signed by the same key. That's what I got out of what they were saying. As in, 'this whole charade is pointless ... but it does solve this somewhat tangentially related problem ... kinda'. > "Whoever holds the same key that signed this package" This only matters if you care or know what the keys are. If your guards let anyone in with a blue pass, it doesn't matter what the name is on the pass or if it even matches the name of the person.
    - lxgr 2y ago
      If nobody cares at all who signed a message, you don't need a signature scheme. > 'this whole charade is pointless ... but it does solve this somewhat tangentially related problem ... kinda'. I'd assume it isn't – why else would they be doing it (other than for compatibility with some package distribution scheme that, for other use cases, enforces the existence of a signature, which is arguably just a special case of "you don't need a signature scheme").

ted_dunning 2y ago

I don't think that works. Attackers could generate a key and sign a hacked artifact. Yes, somebody signed that artifact you might say, but I would worry who signed it and how much I should trust them.