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LinkedIn admits passwords were stored unsalted
- mjschultz 14y ago> members whose passwords have not been compromised benefit from the enhanced security we just recently put in place, which includes hashing and salting of our current password databases. If we presume that the 6.5m password dump was the past version, it shows that they just hashed the passwords before. This sentence (if I'm interpreting correctly), indicates that they were plaintext and were recently changed from plaintext to hash(salt+password). I must be missing something in my interpretation though, because there isn't any evidence that they had the plaintext passwords to begin with. (My assumption is that he means any user that has recently logged in was transparently moved to the hash(salt+password) scheme they are using now and previously just had hash(password) in place.)
- unreal37 14y agoI don't interpret that as meaning any passwords were stored as plaintext. The act of logging in caused them to create a new password hash that included a salt, which was stored in the database (and presumably wiped out the old one.) That all can be done without plaintext storage.
- mjschultz 14y agoRight, that's what my assumption is too but I didn't see anything in the post that says "recently logged in users" or "once you log in you'll be protected by the new scheme." Just "members whose passwords have not been compromised benefit [from the new scheme]".
- daave 14y ago> Members that have accounts associated with the compromised passwords will notice that their LinkedIn account password is no longer valid. I wonder if they know how those particular hashes that were leaked got stolen, if not, they should assume the whole database was stolen and only some of it has been leaked publicly, thus necessitating that this action be taken for all users accounts, not just the ones that match the hashes in the leak. > It is worth noting that the affected members who update their passwords and members whose passwords have not been compromised benefit from the enhanced security we just recently put in place, which includes hashing and salting of our current password databases. Huh? For people who change their password, fine, but 'for members whose passwords have not been compromised', how are they re-hashing them with salt unless they have the original (plaintext) passwords on file. Or are they doing H(salt + H(pass)), rather than H(salt + pass)? If the latter, then hopefully they are at least re-hashing your password next time you log in, but most people don't log in very often - my cookies certainly haven't been expired. A co-worker tells me that even after changing his password through the website, the login credentials on the Android app were not expired!
- blantonl 14y agoWhat is most troubling about this post is that it appears that LinkedIn still at this time doesn't know the attack vector.
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- xtreme 14y agoI can't think of any reason not to salt passwords at this age.
- jimktrains2 14y agoOr, you know, bcrypt or PBKDF2 or something...
- gshakir 14y agoLinkedIn should compensate the compromised accounts by giving them upgraded accounts.