While it's true that North Korea's tradecraft within the U.S. might not be as sophisticated as some fear, the situation isn't so straightforward. Given the sign

While it's true that North Korea's tradecraft within the U.S. might not be as sophisticated as some fear, the situation isn't so straightforward. Given the significant public exposure of this case and the individual's prior connections within the U.S. government, NK would need to carefully weigh their options. I would wager that if NK would attempt to harm this hacker it would be through using third parties like cartels or local gangs. This could offer NK plausible deniability and physical access to the target, but it also complicates their operational control and increases the risk of exposure. The calculus for NK would include considerations such as: - The individual's public and former government status, which might provoke a stronger U.S. response if harmed. NK would have to vet the hackers assertions that he still has meaningful and significant contacts within the USG. - The cost and complexity of outsourcing such an operation discretely. - The types of U.S. responses that might follow, from diplomatic measures to cyber counterattacks. While an attack via third parties is plausible, and given these factors which I am sure there are others I haven't considered, it would require NK to balance the benefits against the potential repercussions and the likelihood of successful attribution. But I am very confident that if they do follow through it will be using a cartel or local gang as proxy for the reasons I mentioned. P4x's public disclosures and technical skills make him a unique target, but as he himself noted, the operational capabilities of North Korea within the U.S. are limited. It's a nuanced threat landscape where indirect methods might be considered but are not guaranteed to succeed without significant risks.