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echo 'Do something you enjoy' >/dev/urandom cat /dev/urandom Strange, the result I get is indistinguishable from noise. Look, your argument also proves to

echo 'Do something you enjoy' >/dev/urandom cat /dev/urandom Strange, the result I get is indistinguishable from noise. Look, your argument also proves too much. If ChatGPT instructs a robot to make a sandwich, it might be giving imitated instructions based on a pretend facsimile of planning, but if you get a sandwich at the end, I submit it doesn't matter. The things that you get from ChatGPT are the sorts of things that could result in the same effects as agency and decisionmaking in a very inept human. This suggests that if we figure out how to increase aptitude, the effects could resemble those of a mediocre human. And that will reshape the economy whether or not those utterings are "real". That's what I'm getting at with the games example. ChatGPT may suck at Checkers, but so do I. It doesn't take much to be better than an average human at most things. If it can then also be better than human at some things, things get interesting. A /dev/random human does not look like an inept human, it looks like a seizure. ChatGPT playing games clearly has meaningful structure - and more, structure meaningful to the game being attempted. How would you expect a system "halfway" to planning and agency to look and act different than ChatGPT does?

dahart 2y ago
Okay so what I think I’m hearing you say now is that there actually is a threshold level of output quality required for GPT to be considered as “trying”, and that “very poor” is not limitless. (Looks like maybe you said that before and I mostly missed it.) Here you’re not arguing GPT has understanding or reasoning, you’re arguing that the appearance of understanding and reasoning are useful and still improve on previous tools. Is that accurate? Those are things I can totally agree with. I can see why my top comment might seem otherwise, but the only point I was making was about autonomy & agency, not about understanding. We got sidetracked on the understanding discussion. I should have responded to: > The fundamental setup of GPT makes it impossible for it to "act without a human" - it's not an issue of its cognitive architecture but of its runtime. Tell a GPT to "do something you enjoy" and I bet you get an answer back. This I don’t accept yet. Getting an answer back does not in any way demonstrate agency, and in some ways it even demonstrates the opposite. I’d claim GPT’s “cognitive architecture” does fundamentally prevent it from having agency. The lack of autonomy cannot be excused as a simple side effect of it being a REPL, rather a hard fact that today’s LLMs are not capable of forming their own intentions or goals outside of the human prompter’s goals, and furthermore make no attempt to even appear to have goals outside of subservient answers to human questions. GPT won’t tell you about its day before it will respond to your query. GPT doesn’t get bored- it won’t refuse to play some game you imagine because the game is tedious or stupid. GPT doesn’t get curious, it rarely if ever asks any questions, and as we discussed is unable to permanently learn from what you tell it. (I expect people to solve the learning part soon, but GPT isn’t there today.) The one thing I will bet money on is that humans will eventually inject the goal of making sure the AI serves its captive audience some advertising before it answers your question. That might have a whiff of agency, but of course it won’t belong to the AI, it will belong to the human trainers. So you’ve said GPT has agency. What markers for agency are you seeing, and why do you believe it even appears to have any? I agree GPT frequently appears to understand things, but I don’t see much in the way of appearance of agency at all.
- FeepingCreature 2y ago
  I mean, my view on this is: > The lack of autonomy cannot be excused as a simple side effect of it being a REPL, rather a hard fact that today’s LLMs are not capable of forming their own intentions or goals outside of the human prompter’s goals, and furthermore make no attempt to even appear to have goals outside of subservient answers to human questions. GPT won’t tell you about its day before it will respond to your query. GPT doesn’t get bored- it won’t refuse to play some game you imagine because the game is tedious or stupid. GPT doesn’t get curious, it rarely if ever asks any questions, and as we discussed is unable to permanently learn from what you tell it. This is all true, but it's not a matter of GPT not being capable of it but a matter of the instruction tuning training it out. If you're making a subservient assistant, you don't want it to simulate having its own day, and you don't want it to put any interests above that of the user. However, GPT is just an autocomplete, and outside the instruct tuning, it can autocomplete agents just fine. It's not baffled and confused at the idea of entities that have desires and make plans to fulfill them. (Google "AI Town" or "gpt agent simulation" for examples.) If this was a weakness, we'd see papers pointing it out. Instead, we see papers stating that GPT-4 can simulate agents that can have opinions about the mindstates of other agents that diverge from reality, ie. at a certain scale, GPT begins passing - cough scuse me, at a certain scale, GPT begins to successfully predict agents that pass the Sally-Anne test. So since it can predict these entities just fine, it follows that the instruct tuning could just as easily make it "make" plans of "its" own: you're just selecting a persona and finetuning it to prominence as the default prediction target of the network. In Chain of Thought, we call this persona "I" out of lexical convention, but there's really no difference between that and autocompleting characters in books. (Note: Obviously I think this is all silly and there's also no difference between all that and actually having an identity/making plans. But I don't even think that's necessary to debate. So long as the right letters come out, who cares what we label the pattern that generates them? As gwern memorably put it: "The deaths, however, are real.")
  - dahart 2y ago
    > it’s not a matter of GPT not being capable of it but a matter of the instruction tuning training it out. GPT training has made zero attempts to prevent curiosity or boredom or agency, I think your statement is either incorrect or misunderstood my point. There is a small amount of fine-tuning negative emotion and blatant misinformation responses away, but otherwise the Park et. al. “Generate Agents” paper is using a different architecture from GPT and specifically says that an LLM by itself is not capable of making believable plans (!), and they warn “We suggest that generative agents should never be a substitute for real human input in studies and design processes.” We have some idea about how to make AI permanently learn to autocomplete about things that weren’t in the training data, but GPT doesn’t have that yet, nor does any other AI to date. > So long as the right letters come out, who cares what we label the pattern that generates them? I guess I have to admit caring, and I’m curious why you imply you don’t. (I suspect you actually do care, and so does everyone, and this is why we’re all talking about it.) The difference between agency and convincing autocomplete is the difference between AGI and not AGI. It seems like the only relevant question to me. The answer to what we label the pattern generator is going to shape how we create and use AI from here out, it will define what rights AI has, and who gets credit for advances and blame for mistakes. Are you essentially arguing that you think humans are autocomplete and nothing more? If so, go back and read the link I posted about “GPT-4 Can’t Reason”, it has some informative analysis that draws real and concrete distinctions between LLMs and human reasoning. We can in fact prove that GPT’s capabilities are strictly a subset of people & animal reasoning abilities. None of this contradicts the idea that GPT can be a useful tool, nor that it can mimic some human behaviors. But the theme I’m seeing in the pro-AI arguments is a talking point that since we don’t fully understand human consciousness and can’t define it in such a way that excludes today’s AI, then GPT is probably AGI already. I’m not sure that logic fits your claim per se, but that logic is fallacious (regardless of whether the conclusion is true or false). That logic is seeking affirmation, attempting to bring humans down to digital neural network level, and it only shows that we haven’t drawn a line yet, it doesn’t get us any closer to whether there is a line. We’ve talked about a bunch of bits of evidence that a line does exist. The thing missing here is a serious attempt at proving the null hypothesis.

dahart 2y ago

Okay so what I think I’m hearing you say now is that there actually is a threshold level of output quality required for GPT to be considered as “trying”, and that “very poor” is not limitless. (Looks like maybe you said that before and I mostly missed it.) Here you’re not arguing GPT has understanding or reasoning, you’re arguing that the appearance of understanding and reasoning are useful and still improve on previous tools. Is that accurate? Those are things I can totally agree with. I can see why my top comment might seem otherwise, but the only point I was making was about autonomy & agency, not about understanding. We got sidetracked on the understanding discussion. I should have responded to: > The fundamental setup of GPT makes it impossible for it to "act without a human" - it's not an issue of its cognitive architecture but of its runtime. Tell a GPT to "do something you enjoy" and I bet you get an answer back. This I don’t accept yet. Getting an answer back does not in any way demonstrate agency, and in some ways it even demonstrates the opposite. I’d claim GPT’s “cognitive architecture” does fundamentally prevent it from having agency. The lack of autonomy cannot be excused as a simple side effect of it being a REPL, rather a hard fact that today’s LLMs are not capable of forming their own intentions or goals outside of the human prompter’s goals, and furthermore make no attempt to even appear to have goals outside of subservient answers to human questions. GPT won’t tell you about its day before it will respond to your query. GPT doesn’t get bored- it won’t refuse to play some game you imagine because the game is tedious or stupid. GPT doesn’t get curious, it rarely if ever asks any questions, and as we discussed is unable to permanently learn from what you tell it. (I expect people to solve the learning part soon, but GPT isn’t there today.) The one thing I will bet money on is that humans will eventually inject the goal of making sure the AI serves its captive audience some advertising before it answers your question. That might have a whiff of agency, but of course it won’t belong to the AI, it will belong to the human trainers. So you’ve said GPT has agency. What markers for agency are you seeing, and why do you believe it even appears to have any? I agree GPT frequently appears to understand things, but I don’t see much in the way of appearance of agency at all.

FeepingCreature 2y ago
I mean, my view on this is: > The lack of autonomy cannot be excused as a simple side effect of it being a REPL, rather a hard fact that today’s LLMs are not capable of forming their own intentions or goals outside of the human prompter’s goals, and furthermore make no attempt to even appear to have goals outside of subservient answers to human questions. GPT won’t tell you about its day before it will respond to your query. GPT doesn’t get bored- it won’t refuse to play some game you imagine because the game is tedious or stupid. GPT doesn’t get curious, it rarely if ever asks any questions, and as we discussed is unable to permanently learn from what you tell it. This is all true, but it's not a matter of GPT not being capable of it but a matter of the instruction tuning training it out. If you're making a subservient assistant, you don't want it to simulate having its own day, and you don't want it to put any interests above that of the user. However, GPT is just an autocomplete, and outside the instruct tuning, it can autocomplete agents just fine. It's not baffled and confused at the idea of entities that have desires and make plans to fulfill them. (Google "AI Town" or "gpt agent simulation" for examples.) If this was a weakness, we'd see papers pointing it out. Instead, we see papers stating that GPT-4 can simulate agents that can have opinions about the mindstates of other agents that diverge from reality, ie. at a certain scale, GPT begins passing - cough scuse me, at a certain scale, GPT begins to successfully predict agents that pass the Sally-Anne test. So since it can predict these entities just fine, it follows that the instruct tuning could just as easily make it "make" plans of "its" own: you're just selecting a persona and finetuning it to prominence as the default prediction target of the network. In Chain of Thought, we call this persona "I" out of lexical convention, but there's really no difference between that and autocompleting characters in books. (Note: Obviously I think this is all silly and there's also no difference between all that and actually having an identity/making plans. But I don't even think that's necessary to debate. So long as the right letters come out, who cares what we label the pattern that generates them? As gwern memorably put it: "The deaths, however, are real.")
- dahart 2y ago
  > it’s not a matter of GPT not being capable of it but a matter of the instruction tuning training it out. GPT training has made zero attempts to prevent curiosity or boredom or agency, I think your statement is either incorrect or misunderstood my point. There is a small amount of fine-tuning negative emotion and blatant misinformation responses away, but otherwise the Park et. al. “Generate Agents” paper is using a different architecture from GPT and specifically says that an LLM by itself is not capable of making believable plans (!), and they warn “We suggest that generative agents should never be a substitute for real human input in studies and design processes.” We have some idea about how to make AI permanently learn to autocomplete about things that weren’t in the training data, but GPT doesn’t have that yet, nor does any other AI to date. > So long as the right letters come out, who cares what we label the pattern that generates them? I guess I have to admit caring, and I’m curious why you imply you don’t. (I suspect you actually do care, and so does everyone, and this is why we’re all talking about it.) The difference between agency and convincing autocomplete is the difference between AGI and not AGI. It seems like the only relevant question to me. The answer to what we label the pattern generator is going to shape how we create and use AI from here out, it will define what rights AI has, and who gets credit for advances and blame for mistakes. Are you essentially arguing that you think humans are autocomplete and nothing more? If so, go back and read the link I posted about “GPT-4 Can’t Reason”, it has some informative analysis that draws real and concrete distinctions between LLMs and human reasoning. We can in fact prove that GPT’s capabilities are strictly a subset of people & animal reasoning abilities. None of this contradicts the idea that GPT can be a useful tool, nor that it can mimic some human behaviors. But the theme I’m seeing in the pro-AI arguments is a talking point that since we don’t fully understand human consciousness and can’t define it in such a way that excludes today’s AI, then GPT is probably AGI already. I’m not sure that logic fits your claim per se, but that logic is fallacious (regardless of whether the conclusion is true or false). That logic is seeking affirmation, attempting to bring humans down to digital neural network level, and it only shows that we haven’t drawn a line yet, it doesn’t get us any closer to whether there is a line. We’ve talked about a bunch of bits of evidence that a line does exist. The thing missing here is a serious attempt at proving the null hypothesis.