4 ms·

Wouldn’t there still need to be a major vulnerability with the TLS library your client is using?

• supriyo-biswas 2y ago
  You can obtain a certificate for the domain in question (easier if you are a nation-state) and MITM that specific user.
  • theamk 2y ago
    ... but you need to MITM server to obtain certificate, and if you can MITM server, why bother with user's wifi?
    • supriyo-biswas 2y ago
      Because it’s easier that the server be MITMed for a shorter duration to prevent discovery[1]. It’s also easier if you can just strong arm the CA to issue a certificate or have the shady CA issue it[2][3]. [1] http://notes.valdikss.org.ru/jabber.ru-mitm/ http://notes.valdikss.org.ru/jabber.ru-mitm/ [2] https://www.wired.com/2010/03/packet-forensics/ https://www.wired.com/2010/03/packet-forensics/ [3] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1391063 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1391063
  • yjftsjthsd-h 2y ago
    How does one bypass certificate transparency? I tend to exclude state actors from my threat models (1. they tend to be the all-powerful boogeyman that bypasses all threat models anyways, and 2. I doubt that the NSA is going to get you by way of coffee shop wifi) but I'm actually struggling to see how even they would bypass this particular protection; if Chrome only trusts CT-logged certs, even a targeted one-off is likely to be discovered (albeit, AIUI, after the fact).