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This is a ruling from an Administrative Law Judge, which basically functions as a strong recommendation for how the National Labor Relations Board should decide
by granzymes 2y ago
This is a ruling from an Administrative Law Judge, which basically functions as a strong recommendation for how the National Labor Relations Board should decide a particular case. ALJs are Article II “in house” judges that specialize in the law of one particular administrative agency. They don’t have Constitutional life tenure protections and mostly do claims processing work for the Social Security Administration.
The next step in this case is for a 3-member panel of the NLRB (a 5 member board appointed by the President, currently with 4 members) to decide whether to accept the proposed ruling of the ALJ or to substitute their own opinion of how the case should come out.
Orders of the NLRB are not self-executing, so parties can appeal an adverse judgement to the Circuit of Appeals of their choice and the NLRB can cross-petition for enforcement of their decision. The Federal courts have final say over questions of law like “are non competes a violation of labor law”.
The entire process takes several years to play out.
- dataflow 2y agoThat's exactly what I was wondering, thank you!
- baryphonic 2y agoNot to be too pedantic, but ALJs are technically Article I judges (or more precisely judges over Article I tribunals). The Constitution lists two different sources of judicial power, the first in Article I section 8 and the second in Article III. Article III courts have judges with life tenure, protection of salaries and are subject to review only by other Article III appeals courts including the Supreme Court. Article I courts have judges with fixed terms of office, and Congress can cut their salaries. All Article I courts are subject to review by Article III courts. There's an open controversy about how much deference the Article I courts in administrative agencies are owed by Article III courts, arising mostly from Chevron v NRDC. That decision requires Article III courts to defer to Article I courts' interpretations of their statutes and even their administrative rules except in extreme circumstances. Several justices on the Supreme Court find Chevron deference problematic, but it currently is the law of the land.