I honestly appreciate the decision to not release the code ("I’m not going to be publishing this code since I can’t think of a good use anyone would have for th

I honestly appreciate the decision to not release the code ("I’m not going to be publishing this code since I can’t think of a good use anyone would have for this besides folks using a low cost SDR and annoying local resturants"). All too often have I seen security researchers release fully weaponized attack tools that then promptly get used by attackers (and not the pranking kind of attackers either). Could the attacker write it themselves? Probably. Will reducing the cost by providing ready-made code increase attacks? Almost certainly. I wish that more people would consider whether releasing the code will be a net benefit (by enabling legitimate research, education, proof-of-concept demonstrations of vulnerability) or harm (by enabling malicious attacks). Even if the underlying exploit/vuln/feature is the same, form matters: A ready-to-use attack toolkit with multi-client management capability is much more likely to be useful to attackers than defenders, where a simple proof of concept that is hardcoded to show a pre-defined message with no easy way to change that is much less likely to be reused maliciously. And pranking a pager system sounds pretty harmless, until you realize that a restaurant is likely quite strongly relying on it and essentially DoS'ing it has the potential to affect their business.